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I. INTRODUCTION
Does the language of a broadcast's program appropriately define an
antitrust market, consistent with First Amendment and antitrust principles?
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has traditionally defined the market for
mass media transactions by type of media, casting radio as competing in
one market, and over-the-air television, for example, in another.' Within
the medium of radio, the DOJ has divided the market by the language of
the broadcast, defining Spanish-language radio as a separate market from
English-language radio in its 2008 analysis of the proposed private equity
firm buyout of Clear Channel, and in its 2003 review of the merger of
Univision Communications, Inc. ("Univision") and Hispanic Broadcasting
1. See Howard Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger
StandardsProtectthe Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REv. 371, 406 (2006).
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Corporation ("HBC"), leading broadcasters of Spanish-language television
and radio, respectively. 2 This Article contends that the decision to define an
antitrust market by the broadcast's language raises concerns about its
constitutionality and its effect on competition and democracy. If inaccurate,
the market definition may not only distort competition, it may limit the
broadcaster's freedom of speech and the public's ability to hear that
programming. The First Amendment protects speakers and those who wish
to hear that speaker's message.
The debate about the relevant market for broadcasters engaged in
Spanish-language programming continued to reverberate in the 2007 sale
of Univision to a consortium of private equity firms. Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") Commissioner Michael Copps
criticized the FCC's approval of the Univision sale for its failure to decide
"whether Spanish-language programming constitutes a separate market
segment that must be analyzed in isolation from English-speaking
programming."4 In its 2008 approval of the purchase of Clear Channel by a
consortium of private equity firms, the FCC did not address the issue of
whether the Clear Channel stations programmed in Spanish competed in a
separate market, in contrast to the DOJ's definition of the relevant market
for analyzing the effect of the potential Clear Channel buyers' equity and
voting interests in Univision as "the provision of advertising time on
Spanish-language radio stations."5 Future transactions involving stations
2. U.S. v. Bain Capital LLC, Civ. Action 1:08-cv-00245, Complaint 22 (D.C. Feb.
13, 2008), [hereinafter Bain, Clear Channel Complaint]. In 2003, the DOJ approved the
merger of Univision and HBC with conditions and defined the relevant market as "Spanishlanguage radio." See Complaint for Injunctive Relief, U.S. v. Univision Commc'n Inc., No.
11, [hereinafter
1:03CV00758, 2003 WL 23192527 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) at *4,
Univision HBC Complaint].
3. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 75657 (1976); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("[T]he right to receive ideas is a
necessary predicate to the recipient'smeaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press,
and political freedom.").
4. See Shareholders of Univision Communications, Inc., (Transferor) and Broadcast
Media Partners (Transferee), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 FCC Rcd 5842, 5876
(2007) ("Univision BMP MO&O").
5. Clear Channel is the largest radio company in the United States controlling licenses
for 1,172 radio stations and 35 television stations as of January 2008, and is also a leading
provider of Spanish and bilingual radio programming. See Existing Shareholders of Clear
Channel Communications, Inc. (Transferors) and Shareholders of Thomas H. Lee Equity
Fund VI, L.P., Bain Capital IX, L.P., and BT Triple Crown Capital Holdings III, Inc.
Transferees For Consent of Transfer of Control of Various Licenses, BTCCT4 (January 24, 2008)
200661212AVR, et. al., Memorandum Opinion and Order
[hereinafter FCC Clear Channel MO&O]; Press Release, Clear Channel, Clear Channel
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programming in Spanish or other non-English languages that are
sufficiently large to trigger antitrust merger review will require similar
analysis of the role of language in defining an antitrust market.6
The FCC's reconsideration of the limits on how many radio and
television stations an entity may control locally or nationally and its
evaluation of the cross-media ownership rules limiting newspaper
ownership of television stations in the same market highlighted the role of
Spanish-language media in the overall media market.7 The FCC has
Radio's Multi-Market Spanish-language Programming Initiative Attracting Greater Share of
Radio Listeners in 2005, (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.clearchannel.com/
Radio/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD=1243. The FCC approved Clear Channel's
sale to a consortium of private equity investors on January 24, 2008, requiring divestiture of
the stations in 42 markets which did not comply with the FCC's multiple ownership rules.
FCCClear Channel MO&O, 11. The DOJ approved the transaction on February 13, 2007,
pending Clear Channel's divestiture of certain stations including those Clear Channel
stations that broadcast in Spanish in Houston, Las Vegas and San Francisco. U.S. v. Bain
Capital, et. al., Civ. Action 1:08-cv-00245, Competitive Impact Statement, Sec. III. C. 2.
and IV. A. 2 (D.C. February 13, 2008), available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100
/230166.htm. [hereinafter Bain, Clear Channel Competitive Impact Statement] . The merger
is expected to close by July 30, 2008 if approved at a special Clear Channel shareholders
meeting. Press Release, Clear Channel, Clear Channel Sets Shareholders Special Meeting
Date Of July 24, 2008 - Record Date of June 19, 2008, (June 12, 2008), available at:
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD=2221.
6. Pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Acts, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18(a)(2000) participants in a potential merger transaction must file a notice with the DOJ
or the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") requesting preclearance for the merger if as of
2007, the size of the transaction is $59.8 million or higher. See Federal Trade Commission,
72 Fed. Reg. 2692 (Jan. 22, 2007). Acquisitions valued at between $59.9 million and $239.2
million are subject to preclearance if either the acquired or the acquiring person has net sales
or total assets of $119.6 million or more and the other person has net sales or total assets of
$12 million or more. Id. Many media transactions reach these thresholds because of the size
and number of assets involved, particularly in transactions involving multiple stations. In
practice, small transactions involving single stations might be allowed without preclearance,
but as the company and size of the transactions grow, this market definition will become
critical to the ability of companies specializing in Spanish-language broadcasting to expand.
7. See In Re. 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review - Review of the Comm'n's Broad.
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, et al., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB
Docket No. 06-121 (July 24, 2006), availableat http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attach
match/FCC-06-93Al.pdf In that proceeding, the FCC examined its rules limiting crossownership of newspapers and television stations in the same market, as well as the rules that
govern ownership of television or radio stations within a geographical market. To develop
the factual basis for that proceeding, the FCC commissioned a study by Daniel Shiman,
"News Operations," which revealed that between 2002-2005, after ABC, NBC, and CBS,
Spanish-language television stations owned by or affiliated with Telemundo, Univision, or
TV Azteca broadcast on average more minutes of news than stations affiliated with Fox or
PBS, although stations owned and operated by Fox broadcast on average more news
minutes than each of the Spanish-language networks. See Daniel Shiman, News Operations,
Study 4, Table 1-4, pg. 1-35 (Sept. 20, 2007), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs
_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A5.pdf. These statistics demonstrate the critical role of
Spanish-language media in disseminating news to the American public, and underscore the
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previously rejected the contention that radio markets should be categorized
by language based on evidence of ease of entry between program
languages, and its conclusion that a market divided by program language
would violate the ownership limits set by Congress in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 8 However, the FCC has granted several
temporary and long-term waivers to Spanish- and non-English-language
television and cable stations to foster program diversity. 9 The DOJ has not
yet articulated its position on whether there is a separate Spanish-language
television market.
Using First Amendment jurisprudence, Section II of this Article
analyzes the standard of review for evaluating a market definition based on
a broadcast's language. It rejects the application of the commercial speech
doctrines because the market definition is based on the language of the
broadcast program, not the advertisement. It argues that the lower level of
scrutiny used for structural broadcast regulations is an inappropriate
standard for analyzing the market definition because it subjects certain
types of speech (broadcasts in Spanish) and certain types of speakers
(Spanish-language broadcasters) to higher burdens than their Englishlanguage counterparts, while limiting audiences' ability to hear Spanishlanguage broadcast speech. Section III examines whether defining an
antitrust market by the broadcast's language is a content-based distinction
requiring strict scrutiny or a content-neutral distinction necessitating
intermediate scrutiny.10
This Article uses social science research on Spanish- and Englishlanguage radio and television to evaluate the nexus between language and
importance of analyzing the role of Spanish-language media in the context of media
ownership rules, as well as antitrust law.
8. See Shareholders of Hispanic Broad. Corp. & Univision Commc'n, Inc., 18
F.C.C.R. 18834, 18869-70 (2003) (noting frequency of program format changes between
English and Spanish programming as evidence of lack of separate markets defined by
program language) [hereinafter FCCHBC UVN Order]. See also Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, § 202(a), (b)(l), (c)(1)(B) (1996) (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000)) [hereinafter 1996 Telecomm. Act].
9. See Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitrust Law on the Borderland of Language and
Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-LanguageRadio Market?, 40 U.S.F.L. REV.
381,415 n.203 (2006).
10. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (contentbased regulations on speech require the most exacting scrutiny); Id. at 662 (content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental restriction on speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (content-neutral
regulations on speech must not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests.")).
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content. The research indicates that Spanish- and English-language media
offer distinctive content. For example, Spanish-language news emphasizes
issues of importance to the Latino community and contains far more
information about Latin America than is found on English-language
newscasts. In 2003, the most common image of Latinos broadcast on
English-language television newscasts featured would-be immigrants
scaling a border fence." Entertainment programs also embody messages
about inclusion or exclusion evidenced in the paucity of Latino characters
on English-language television and the portrayal of Latinos and Asians as
13
2
speaking English with heavy accents.' These "regimes of representation"'
influence audience program choices. The overlap between language and
content suggests that defining an antitrust market based on a program's
language is content-based.
While English- and Spanish-language radio and television broadcasts
are characterized by distinctive content, that distinctiveness alone does not
establish a separate antitrust market. Attempts to categorize and separate
media markets may run afoul of constitutional and antitrust principles when
the markets drawn do not reflect the diversity of media usage or ease of
entry between the allegedly separate markets. 14 Section IV A explores the
"substitution" by broadcasters, audiences, and advertisers between program
language, and advertiser alternatives if faced with a price increase by
merging parties. The dynamic movement by broadcasters, advertisers, and
audiences between languages and program formats indicates that media
markets are not rigidly divided by language, but operate as one marketplace
of ideas, with audience and advertiser loyalty contestable between
languages.
Section IV B offers a "supply-side" antitrust analysis that focuses on
broadcaster "entry" or substitution between languages and its relationship
11. See Roberto Suro, Changing Channels and Crisscrossing Cultures: A Survey of
Latinos on the News Media 12-13, Pew Hispanic Center (Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/27.pdf, See Federico Subvervi et al., NETWORK
BROWNOUT REPORT 2005: THE PORTRAYAL OF LATINOS AND LATINO ISSUES ON NETWORK

TELEVISION NEWS , 2004 wrTH A RETROSPECT TO 1995, QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE, at 12, Nat'l Assoc. of Hispanic Journalists (June 2005),
availableat http://www.nahj.org/resources/Brownout%20Report%202005.pdf.
12. See Dana E. Mastro & Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz, Latino Representation on
Primetime Television, 82 JOURNALISM & MASS MEDIA COMMC'N. Q. 110, 125 (Spring 2005).
13. See Esteban Del Rio, The Latinola Problematic: Categories and Questions in
Media Communication Research, 30 COMMC'N. YEARBOOK. 387, 390 (2006) (defining

"regime of representation" as the "repertoire of imagery and visual effects through which
'difference' is represented at any one historical moment.").
14. See Sandoval, supra note 9, at 385 n.9, 393-402, 427-37 (raising the issue of
whether an antitrust market defined by language is a content-based distinction and focusing
on whether antitrust standards used to define a relevant market regarding substitution and
market participation were met).
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to consolidation strategies designed to reap economies of scale. In defining
the market, the DOJ assumed that no English-language broadcaster would
change its format to compete directly in Spanish.15 This assumption was
wrong at the time of the merger between HBC and Univision. 16 Subsequent
format changes by broadcasters moving between English- and Spanishlanguage programming confirmed that this assumption was misguided. 7
Media consolidation following the 1996 Telecommunications Act made
economies of scale a driving force in radio competition.' 8 Broadcasting in
different languages has become another tool in the arsenal of consolidated
competitors who seek advertisers and audiences through multilingual,
multiformat and multiple-station approaches.
Whether language is the appropriate basis for defining a broadcast
antitrust market has yet to be subject to rigorous judicial review in a
contested proceeding.' 9 This results in part from the fact that many merger
parties enter a consent decree with the DOJ (which is usually filed at the
same time as the complaint) and agree to certain conditions, rather than
challenge the market definition, because they value speedy closure of the
deal.20 Alternatively, the parties may agree to the DOJ's conditions based
upon the Agency's market definition, and its resulting analysis of market
15. See Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Univision Comm. Inc., No.
1:03CV00758, 2003 WL 23192527, at *5, *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Univision
Competitive Impact Statement].
16. See FCC HBC UVN Order, supranote 8.
17. See Joe Howard, United They Stand, RADIO INK, June 19, 2006, available at
http://www.radioink.com/listingsEntry.asp?ID=446892&PT=industryqa (discussing entry of
traditionally English-language broadcasters into Spanish-language radio).
18. The Telecommunications Act eliminated the national cap on the number of AM or
FM radio stations a single entity could control and established ownership limits per
geographical market based on the number of radio stations in the market, prompting a wave
of consolidation. See 1996 Telecomm. Act, supra note 8. See Mari Castafieda Paredes, The
Transformation of Spanish-languageRadio in the US., 10 J. RADIO STUDIES 1 at 8 (2003)
(consolidation in Spanish-language media has mirrored the industry consolidation trends
since the 1996 Telecomm. Act).
19. The District Court for the District of Columbia approved of the consent decree
between Univision and the DOJ, which was based on the market definition as "Spanishlanguage radio," but the court did not examine in depth, nor did the parties challenge that
market definition. See United States v. Univision Commc'n, Inc., 2003 WL 23192527,
2004-1 Trade Cases (CCH), 74,242 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003). Univision was willing to
accept the market definition because it valued the opportunity to acquire HBC more than the
conditions imposed on the company.
20. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 580 (2d ed. 2006) ("Faced with a premerger challenge, parties are
likely to abandon the transaction or push for a settlement that allows completion of as much
of the acquisition as possible without contested litigation.").
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concentration and participation, to dissuade the DOJ from filing a
complaint in U.S. District Court challenging the deal, and instead grant
"early termination" approval of the merger. 2' Thus, scholarly examination
of whether language appropriately defines an antitrust market is critical
since the merger process limits incentives for parties' legal challenges.
In a previous article, Antitrust Law on the Borderland of Language
and Market Definition: Is There a Separate Spanish-Language Radio
Market? A Case Study of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic
Broadcasting Corporation,22 I argued that the DOJ's definition of the
relevant antitrust market as "Spanish-language radio" did not meet the
standard for a submarket definition which the Supreme Court articulated in
Brown Shoe v. United States.23 Although the DOJ's declared intent in
defining the market as "Spanish-language radio" and ordering divestiture
remedies was to protect and foster competition in the sale of advertising
time on Spanish-language radio, 24 the justification for the market definition
and attendant remedies rest on the assumption that the DOJ has correctly
defined the market. The antecedent question is: What is the relevant market
and what are the constitutional limits on using language as the basis to
define an antitrust market in broadcasting?
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND LOWER LEVELS
OF SCRUTINY USED FOR STRUCTURAL BROADCAST
REGULATIONS DO NOT GOVERN ANTITRUST MARKET
DEFINITION ANALYSIS
A.

DistinguishingBroadcastProgrammingFrom Commercial
Speech

A media merger's potential effect on advertising prices raises the
question of whether the commercial speech doctrine should govern the
analysis of constitutional issues involved in the market definition.
Restrictions on commercial speech related to the economic interests of the
speaker, such as regulations of advertising, are subject to a lower
constitutional standard of review than noncommercial speech.
The DOJ views advertisers, rather than the audience, as a radio
station's direct customers. Thus, the DOJ's primary concern in regulating
radio mergers is to make sure that the advertisers are not faced with
21. Id. at 579 ("Today's cases tend to be settled through largely confidential agencyparty negotiation without the benefit of publicly available judicial records and opinions.").
22. See Sandoval, supra note 9, at 381-86.
23. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
24. See Univision HBC Complaint, supra note 2, at 10.
25. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980).
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increased prices because of the merger. In the HBC/Univision merger
analysis, the DOJ's stated concern was that Univision's "proposed
acquisition of HBC would lessen competition substantially in the provision
number of
of Spanish-language radio advertising time to a significant
27
States."
United
the
of
areas
geographic
several
in
advertisers
Broadcasters air programming in order to "create" audiences.
Professors Webster and Phalen observed that "audiences are not naturally
occurring 'facts,' but social creations. ' 28 Broadcasters commodify their
audience, selling advertisers access to their listeners or viewers through a
broadcaster's advertising time.29
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court defined commercial speech
as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience., 30 The Court distinguished between "speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to
government regulation, and other varieties of speech," according "lesser
protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression., 31 The Court concluded, "the protection available for particular
commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation. 32
The market definition used by the DOJ in the Univision/HBC merger
was based on the language of the broadcast, not the language of the
advertisement.33 Since the market definition is not rooted in the
26. See Response to Public Comments, United States v. Univision Commc'ns Inc., No.
3 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2003), available at
1:03CV00758, 2003 WL 23192527,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/comments/201510.htm [hereinafter Response to Public
Comments]. In contrast, the Communications Act of 1934 codified that broadcast spectrum
should be regulated "in the public interest," requiring that the FCC determine that a transfer
of a station license would serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Commc'n
Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000).
27. Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 15, at Sec. 1.
28. JAMES G. WEBSTER & PATRICIA F. PHALEN, THE MASS AUDIENCE, REDISCOVERING
THE DOMINANT MODEL xiii (1997).
29. See AMERICA RODRIGUEZ, MAKING LATINO NEWS, RACE, LANGUAGE, CLASS 5
(1999); PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS: MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND THE AUDIENCE

MARKETPLACE (2003).
30. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
31. Id. at 562, 563.
32. Id.at 563.
33. On many occasions, the language of the advertisement and the program broadcast
are not the same. See, for example, Jose Antonio Vargas, Spanish Ads on English TV? An
Experiment, WASH. POST, May 31, 2005, at COI (Vehix.com ran Spanish-language
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advertisement but in the broadcast programming, the commercial speech
doctrine should not apply. Neither the market definition nor the remedy
regulated the advertiser's commercial speech, though it sought a
competitive market for the advertisers' speech. The market definition was
not based on the language in which the advertisers broadcast, and did not
seek to regulate the manner or content of advertising. Rather, it
distinguished the market by the language of the non-commercial speech,
the language of the news, public affairs, music and entertainment
programming.
Though a broadcaster may air commercials, its programming does not
inherently propose a commercial transaction. It offers free to the public
music, entertainment, news, or public affairs programming. The fact that
such programming may be supported by ads does not transform the
programming itself into a commercial proposition for the audience.34
Since the market definition is based on the programming language
and not the advertising, the commercial speech doctrine does not govern
the analysis of these issues. Accordingly, we examine other constitutional
doctrines to determine the appropriate standard of review.
B.

Antitrust Market Definition Should be Subject to a HigherLevel
of Scrutiny Than That Usedfor StructuralRegulation of
Broadcasting
Many broadcast regulations have been subjected to a lower level of
constitutional scrutiny on the theory that such regulation was needed to
ensure efficient use of the public airwaves. In Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v.
FCC,the Supreme Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge the
FCC's ability to impose certain affirmative obligations on broadcasters and

commercials during an English-language broadcast of WWE Raw and WWE Raw Zone.);
Della de la Fuente, Advertising: LQue? An All-Spanish Ad on English Language TV,
Brandweek, Nov. 19, 2007, available at http://www.brandweek.combw/magazine/article
_display.jsp?vnu content id=1003674384 (Spanish language ads promoting Las Vegas
tourism airing on English-language programming on A&E, Bravo, Fox Sports Net and
Logo). On March 29, 2007, the cable channel Spike TV showed a commercial in Spanish by
the Ad Council and the National Transportation Safety Board on the benefits on wearing
seatbelts during an English-language broadcast of Voyager. (Spike TV, March 29, 2007).
34. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504 n.11 (1981) (distinguishing
between commercial speech and individuals who have a commercial interest in protected
speech such as radio stations and newspapers). See also N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964) (paid editorial advertisements in newspapers are entitled to full First
Amendment protection). The lower level of scrutiny for commercial speech reflects in part
the government's concern for regulating "forms of communication more likely to deceive
the public than to inform it." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. Preventing deception is
important for regulation of advertising, but is not generally applicable to news or
entertainment programming rooted in a broadcaster's exercise of editorial discretion.
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licensing constraints. 35 Red Lion was based on the need to regulate the
36
airwaves given the limited amount of useable radio spectrum. In light of
spectrum scarcity, the FCC has been allowed to impose certain regulations
on broadcast content, such as rules for political broadcasting
advertisements during election season, prohibitions on indecent speech
between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m., rules to prevent undue interference to other
37
spectrum uses and multiple ownership regulations. Those obligations and
constraints apply equally to all broadcasters.
In reviewing regulations prohibiting the broadcast of indecent
programs during hours when children were likely to listen, the Court
commented in FCC v. Pacifica that "of all forms of communication, it is
broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment
protection., 38 The justification for this lower level of protection rests on the
pervasiveness of broadcasts, the medium's accessibility to children and the
scarcity of spectrum.39
The Communications Act of 1934 required the FCC to promulgate
regulations in the public interest to promote the efficient use of the radio
spectrum. 40 The principal goal of U.S. antitrust analysis has become
maintaining a competitive market.4 ' Evaluating constitutional constraints
35. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385-86, 388-90 (1969).
36. Id. at 376-77.
37. See Codification of the Comm'n's Political Programming Rules, 6 F.C.C.R. 5707
(1991); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); RedLion, 395 U.S. 367, 385-86, 38890; 47 C.F.R. § 73.21 (a) (3) (FCC regulation requiring certain classes of AM stations to
reduce their power at night to prevent their strong nighttime signals from drowning out other
signals). See also FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 809 (1978)
(upholding the FCC's decision to prohibit common ownership of newspapers and television
stations in the same geographic market as a structural regulation of use of the airwaves that
was not arbitrary and capricious); Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 244 (2003) ("Minimal
scrutiny is appropriate to the indirect effect upon speech that may attend 'structural'
regulation of the broadcast industry.").
38. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866-67 (1997).
39. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. Since broadcasting is governed by statute and an
extensive regulatory scheme, it has not been subject to "public forum" analysis except in
extremely limited cases such as a televised debate of federal political candidates. Ark. Educ.
Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1998) (forum analysis is incompatible
with editorial discretion given by statute to broadcasters as public trustees).
40. See Commc'n Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2000). FCC v. Pottsville Broad.
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (public interest standard is the touchstone of authority for the
FCC). The FCC is required to ensure that mergers of broadcast licensees serve the public
interest per section 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 310(d).
41. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1703
(1986); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 20, ("If there is universal agreement on one
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on the regulation of speech created by this market definition does not
require the DOJ to adopt the FCC's charge of ensuring that mergers serve
the public interest.42 Instead, it ensures the market is properly defined,
consistent with antitrust law and constitutional limits. In its quest to protect
competition, the government must not impose an undue burden on
speech.4 3
Defining a radio market by language is arguably a governmentimposed distinction of a different character than those upheld under the Red
Lion or Pacifica standard. Not all broadcast regulations warrant a lower
level of constitutional scrutiny. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, the
Court stated that "although the broadcasting industry plainly operates under
restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these restrictions has
generally been to secure the public's First Amendment interest in receiving
a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern."4
The Court added, "these restrictions have been upheld only when we were
satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of
'4 5
public issues, e.g., RedLion.
In League of Women Voters, the Court struck down a 1981
Amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that prohibited noncommercial public broadcasters which received federal funds from airing
editorials. 4 The statute was aimed at a particular type of speech:
"expression of editorial opinion."47 The Court characterized opinions about
"controversial issues of public importance," as speech which "has always
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values." 4
The Court held that the prohibition was a content-based restriction which
"singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to

antitrust goal, it is that antitrust should strive for the efficient allocation of society's
availablegoods and services.") (emphasis in original).
42. See Shelanski, supra note 1, at 417 (the fact that most media merger cases do not
pose a First Amendment problem does not necessarily mean that constitutional concerns
will be absent should the basis for an antitrust enforcement action be content based).
43. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law.. abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Corporations are accorded the
protections of the First Amendment. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
364 (1984).
44. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380.
45. Id. The FCC subsequently abandoned the requirement that broadcasters present
balanced views in news reports, a regulation which was known as the Fairness Doctrine.
Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043, 5057, recon. denied, 3 F.C.C. 2d 2035 (1988).
46. 468 U.S. at 364.
47. Id. at 381.
48. Id.; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of self-government").
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address their chosen audience on matters of public importance. ' 49 The
Court held the Amendment did not meet the test of strict scrutiny and was
overbroad in trying to promote balance by prohibiting certain speakers
from engaging in certain types of speech. 50 It found the burdens on those
prohibited from editorializing to be too large to outweigh the interests that
the government cited to support the legislation. 5'
Similarly, defining a market by the broadcast's language encompasses
all who broadcast exclusively in Spanish because of the choice to use the
Spanish language. While on its face it does not prohibit or limit a type of
speech such as editorializing, its effect may be more pernicious. It sweeps
in all who choose to express their messages in Spanish, targeting both
particular speakers (those who broadcast in Spanish) and types of speech
(any messages broadcast in Spanish). As discussed below, this
classification creates disincentives to broadcast in Spanish because it makes
it more difficult for companies who specialize in Spanish to grow than
those who specialize in English programming. The market definition also
ignores the extent to which broadcasters supply programming and sell
advertising time in multiple languages within a geographic market,
suggesting that language is part of a competitive spectrum, rather than a
defining characteristic of a market. Accordingly, the burdens on speech
must be weighed against the interests and evidence to support the market
definition.
As currently devised, the market definition should also apply to
English-language broadcasters who would be defined as competing in an
"English-language radio market." While this suggests a parity that was
absent in League of Women Voters, it results in uneven burdens because of
the size of the markets. Like the broadcasters in League of Women Voters,
those on one side of the line can engage in more speech than those on the
other side of the line. The larger number of market participants in the
alleged "English-language market" yields lower concentration levels than
the purported "Spanish-language market" when the Herfindahl, Hirshman
Index ("HHI"), a tool used by the DOJ to measure market concentration, is
applied. 52 If these definitions are accepted without a structural analysis of
49. 468 U.S. at 384.
50. See id. at 395, 399.
51. See id. at 402.
52. "Market concentration is a function of the number of firms in a market and their
The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the
respective market shares ....
individual market shares of all the participants." Market share in turn depends on how the
market is defined. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41557-58, § 1.5
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competition between Spanish- and English-language broadcasters, factors
influencing participation in the market, and an analysis of the likelihood of
crossover by broadcasters in supplying programming in different
languages, English-language broadcasters will be allowed more growth
than those which specialize in Spanish, burdening the speech of potential
Spanish-language broadcasters and their audiences. While the government
may remedy antitrust violations in appropriate circumstances, the First
Amendment values at stake in defining a broadcast market by
programming language require a higher standard of review.
Heightened scrutiny may also be appropriate where the government
distinguishes between potential speakers or types of speech. In Bell South
Corporationv. United States, the parties challenged the Cable Act of 1984
and the FCC's regulations that prevented telephone companies and their
affiliates from providing video services over telephone networks. 3 The
district court found that the Act singled out telephone companies and their
affiliates for special treatment; only they were subject to the law's
proscriptions.54 The court held that the restrictions on speech that only
apply to certain types of speakers "must do more than rationally relate to a
legitimate governmental interest ... the degree of scrutiny ... is either
55
strict... or intermediate.,
Arguably speakers in both the English and Spanish-language
programming markets as defined by the DOJ are subject to the same
market share and concentration analysis. However, that analysis depends
on the premise that the market is correctly defined in the first place. If the
market is defined incorrectly, it singles out the class of speakers in the
smaller alleged Spanish-language market for harsher treatment. The thesis
that language is the appropriate dividing line for an antitrust market in
broadcasting should therefore be subject to either intermediate or strict
scrutiny as a content-neutral or content-based distinction, respectively,
rather than the lower level of scrutiny used for structural broadcast
regulations.
(April 2, 1992, revised April 8, 1997) (F.T.C. never codified), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm
[hereinafter Horizontal Merger
Guidelines]. The DOJ has defined both the English and Spanish markets by language rather
than by format such as Spanish Contemporary as opposed to Tropical or Rock as opposed to
Adult Contemporary. See Bain, Clear Channel Complaint, supra note 2, 17, 22, 31, 35
(HHI analysis is based on market shares in English for all formats in which Cumulus and
Clear Channel compete and in Spanish for all formats in which Univision and Clear Channel
compete). See also Sandoval, supra note 9, at 437-45 (analyzing the HHI's design to
magnify concentration levels in markets with few participants, and examining structural
factors affecting market participation in Spanish-language radio).
53. See Bellsouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (1994).
54. See id. at 1341-42.
55. Id.at 1339.
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III. Is DEFINING

AN ANTITRUST RADIO MARKET BY LANGUAGE
A CONTENT-BASED OR A CONTENT-NEUTRAL DISTINCTION?

A.

Standardof Review

The Supreme Court's analysis in Turner I provides a guide for
determining whether regulations of broadcast speech that do not merit the
lower level of scrutiny of Pacifica or Red Lion are content-based or
content-neutral.56 At issue in Turner I was the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which required cable system
operators to offer local, over-the-air broadcast stations as part of their basic
cable package. 57 That regulation is known as "must-carry" because of the
58
requirement that cable operators carry broadcast signals. To determine the
appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny, the Supreme Court held that the
threshold question is whether the regulation was content-based or contentneutral. 59

In Turner I, the Supreme Court stated that the "principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality.., is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the
message it conveys., 6 "By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose
burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in
most instances content neutral."6' The Court emphasized in R.A. V.
62v. City
invalid.,
presumptively
are
regulations
of St. Paul,"[c]ontent-based

56. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994).
57. Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
58. See Turner I, supra note 10 at 630.
59. Id. at 642. Professor Wilson Huhn criticizes this "categorical approach" requiring a
determination of whether the classification is content-based or content-neutral on the basis
that most laws contain both elements. Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of
Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 814 (2004).
60. Turner I, supra note 10, at 642 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)).
61. Turner I, supra note 10, at 643 (citing Members of City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs
on public property "is neutral-indeed it is silent---concerning any speaker's point of
view.")).
62. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Professor Barry McDonald's analysis
of the twenty cases decided between 1980 through 2006 "where a majority of the Court has
applied a strict scrutiny standardfor reasons of content discrimination,"noted that the Court
"has found every one to be unconstitutional." (emphasis added) Barry P. McDonald, Speech
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protectingthe Freedom of Expression, 81
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1365 (2006).
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Content-based restrictions on speech require strict scrutiny, the
demonstration of a compelling state interest in the regulation, and the
choice of the least restrictive means to accomplish that objective.6 3 A
content-based distinction must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest. 64 If strict scrutiny is required, the government must use the
least restrictive means.65
Content-neutral regulations require intermediate scrutiny and a
showing of a substantial government interest in the regulation or
government distinction. 66 A content-neutral regulation must not "burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's
legitimate interests.
To justify regulation of speech, the government must do more than
"posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured., 68 "[The
government] must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a
direct and material way.",69 The government bears the burden of
demonstrating that it has a compelling or substantial interest in
ameliorating the alleged harm, and that its remedy is appropriately
tailored. 70 The Court concluded in Turner I, "[o]ur precedents thus apply
the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content."'
B.

Is the Market Definition Content-Basedor Content-Neutral?

The Turner I Court observed that cable systems were subject to the
must-carry regulation because of the technical medium--cable, not
broadcast-that they used to transmit their messages. 72 Must-carry
regulations burdened cable systems and benefited over-the-air television
broadcasters irrespective of the content of the over-the-air broadcast
programs. 73 The must-carry requirement was triggered by the technical

63. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642.
64. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
65. See id. at 326.
66. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
67. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
68. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 664 (1994) (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d
1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
69. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664.
70. See Ark. Writers Project Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (government
bears burden of proof for content-neutral regulation).
71. Turner1,512 U.S. at 642 (citing Simon & Schuster v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991)).
72. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645.
73. See id.
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distinction between the facilities used to reach the audience. The Court in
TurnerI commented:
It is true that the must-carry provisions distinguish between speakers in
the television programming market. But they do so based only upon
the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and
not upon the messages they carry: Broadcasters, which transmit over
the airwaves,
74 are favored, while cable programmers, which do not, are
disfavored.
The technical distinctions between the cable and broadcast media
determined whether cable companies had to carry broadcasters under the
must-carry rules, and created the imperative for the must-carry regulation
to prevent cable companies from using their facilities to reduce competition
from broadcasters.
In contrast, an antitrust market defined by the broadcast's language is
not founded on technical distinctions such as those that led the Turner I
Court to conclude that the must-carry regulation was content-neutral.
Spanish- and English-language radio and television broadcasters use the
same spectrum to transmit their messages.
Spanish-language broadcasters do not use a different "media" in the
sense that over-the-air broadcast television uses a different
telecommunications medium from cable. The dividing line between
Spanish and English-language broadcasters is based on programming
language, not the technical transmission method or spectrum efficiency
goals such as limiting interference so other licensed stations can be heard.75
The TurnerI Court noted that the interests cited to support must-carry
were not related to "the suppression of free expression" or to the "content
of any speakers' messages., 76 The must-carry rules were content-neutral
because the "objective in enacting must-carry was not to favor
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint or format, but rather
to preserve free television programming for the 40 percent of Americans
without cable. 77 Thus, one of the Cable Act's goals was to preserve
structural competition between over-the-air television and cable.78

74. Id.
75. See Red Lion supra note 35, at 385-86, 388-90; 47 C.F.R. § 73.21 (a) (3) (FCC
regulation requiring certain classes of AM stations to reduce their power at night to prevent
their strong nighttime signals from drowning out other signals).
76. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
77. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 646 (1994).
78. See id.at 652.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

Defining a media market by the broadcasts' language is not designed
to preserve structural competition between Spanish- and English-language
radio, akin to competition between cable and over-the-air television. In
fact, the market definition assumes no competition between Spanish- and
English-languagemedia. It seeks to preserve a competitive market within
Spanish-language radio and selects which stations fall within which market
based upon the choice to broadcast messages in Spanish.
The government's principal purpose in evaluating the HBC/Univision
merger was to determine whether the merger would lessen competition in
the relevant market which it defined as "the provision of Spanish-language
radio advertising time," and it proposed a remedy requiring that Univision
divest of some of its equity and rights in Entravision to "preserve
competition in the sale of radio advertising time on Spanish-language
stations" 79 On its face, promoting competition within a media market is
similar to one of Congress's principal motives in the must-carry regulations
at issue in Turner I: promoting fair competition in the market for video
programming. 80
The government might argue that this market definition is a contentneutral structural regulation to preserve competition within each broadcast
language market, rather than a content-based regulation that seeks to
regulate speech within markets. However, even if conceived of as a
structural regulation, that goal rests on the assumption that there is a
separate market to be dominated. The government bears the burden of
proof that the markets are separate, the antitrust aspects of which are
analyzed in Section IV of this Article. For constitutional analysis, the use
of language to define the market raises the question of whether that
dividing mechanism is a proxy for content.
In its "Response to Public Comments" about the HBClUnivision
merger, the DOJ emphasized that it "is not the role of the United States to
use the antitrust laws to regulate actual content ... [but the] United States
does seek to ensure that content is determined in a competitive marketplace
.,,8 The DOJ concluded that the "relief in the Final Judgment that
protects advertising competition also serves to protect individual audience
members by maintaining vigorous competition between the Spanish-

79. See Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 15, at Sec. I, VI.
80. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 662. Through must-carry, Congress also sought to promote the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources. Id.
81. Response to Public Comments, supra note 26, at 12. Professor Shelanski observed
that antitrust law is "primarily concerned with competition and economic performance,
defined in terms of prices and quantities of goods (or services) in a given market."
Shelanski, supra note 1, at 397. This contrasts with a "democracy model of the public
interest... [which] sees diversity and quality of programming as values in themselves." Id.
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language radio
stations owned by Univision/HBC and those owned by
82
Entravision.
Claiming that the decision to define and regulate the market is neutral
as to content does not make it so. League of Women Voters demonstrates
that an ostensibly content-neutral justification (i.e., safeguard the public's
right to a balanced presentation of public issues through the prevention of
either governmental or private bias) will not save a government regulation
from a First Amendment challenge when it targets speech by content (i.e.
expression of editorial opinion) and creates undue burdens on protected
speech.8 3While the justification of protecting competition may appear
neutral on its face, we must examine whether choosing language as the
characteristic that delineates the market is based on content, and weigh its
effects on protected speech.
Like the ban against a noncommercial broadcaster editorializing in
League of Women Voters, the market definition affords opportunities for
expression in large part according to the language the broadcaster chooses.
Defining a market by language sweeps in all content, ideas, and views,
depending on whether the speaker chooses to express them in Spanish or
English. The broadcasters are slotted into this market definition based on
the language they choose to express their messages.84 The choice of
language is laden with meaning, and as discussed below, is often closely
associated with the content and character of the message.
In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court recognized the choice of
words as speech, rather than a "manner" of speech or conduct.85 The Court
observed in Cohen that "words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force" such that the emotive aspect "may often be the
more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated., 86 The Court held that an attempt to ban expression of
speech based on the language of the message is a regulation of speech, not

82. Response to Public Comments, supra note 26, at 12.
83. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380, 381.
84. See Asian American Bus. Group v. City of Pomona, 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D.
Ca. 1989) (Language is expression of national origin, culture and ethnicity. Consequently, a
regulation requiring that signs in a foreign alphabet devote half of the space to English
alphabetical characters is a regulation of content).
85. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing a criminal conviction for
disturbing the peace by offensive conduct when a man wore a jacket through the courthouse
corridor bearing the words "Fuck the draft.").
86. Id.
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a regulation of conduct which has an incidental effect on speech.87 While
Cohen involved a choice of words within the English-language, its logic
indicates that the choice to use a different language should also be viewed
as a regulation of speech, not conduct.
In Ruiz v. Hull, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality under federal and state law of an amendment to the
Arizona state constitution requiring that the "State and all political
subdivisions of [the] State shall act in English and in no other language., 88
The court rejected the ballot proponent's argument that "the decision to
speak a non-English language does not implicate pure speech rights, but
rather only affects the 'mode of communication.' ' 89 The court concluded
that the ban on government speech in a language other than English "bars
communication itself."90 Thus, "its effect cannot be characterized as merely
a time, place, or manner restriction because such restrictions, by definition,
assume and require the availability of alternative means of
communication. 9' The Arizona Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to
the amendment because it impinged on First Amendment rights.9 2
The decision to speak in a particular language is a choice rooted in
speech itself. In Yniguez v. Arizonansfor Official English, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, "[s]peech in any language is still speech and the decision to
speak in another language is a decision involving speech alone. 93 The
Ninth Circuit found that a regulation requiring the state of Arizona to "act"
in English did not single out one word for repression, "but rather entire
vocabularies." 94 Similarly, defining a market by language may restrict not
just words or subject matters, but a wide range of expression implied by the
choice of language.
In Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona,95 the district
court reviewed the City of Pomona's ordinance requiring a sign containing
"foreign" alphabetical characters to devote half of its advertising copy
space to English text and display the address in Arabic numerals. The court
determined that "[b]y requiring one half of the space of a foreign alphabet

87. See id.at 18, 26.
88. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
89. Id.at 998.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.at 991.
93. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 1995)
(vacated on other grounds because plaintiff lacked standing after she quit her job with the
state of Arizona).
94. Id. at 935.
95. 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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sign to be devoted to English alphabetical characters, the ordinance
regulates the cultural expression of the sign owner., 96 In light of cases
finding a tie between language and national origin, the court emphasized
that "[c]hoice of language is a form of expression as real as the textual
message conveyed. It is an expression of culture., 97 It concluded, "[s]ince
the language used is an expression of national origin, culture and ethnicity,
regulation of the sign language is a regulation of content., 98 Thus, it
applied strict scrutiny to the ordinance as a content-based regulation.
Under the Asian American Business Group standard, separating radio
markets by language is a content-based distinction, closely linked with
expression, culture and national origin. Professor Christopher Cameron has
written, "language is not merely a carrier of content, whether latent, or
manifest. Language itself is content . .. and [manifests] the large-scale
99
value-laden areas of interaction that typify every speech community."
This analysis indicates that the decision to define markets by the
broadcast's language is based on speech. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the choice of language often conveys distinctive messages. An
analysis of the social science research on media content discussed in the
following section demonstrates that Spanish- and English-language
broadcasters tend to offer distinctive content. These differences indicate

96. Id. at 1330.
97. Id.
98. Id. The correlation between the market definition based on language and the
predominance of Latino- and Spanish-speakers in the audience raises the question of
whether the market definition violates the requirement of equal protection under the law.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. In Ruiz v. Hull, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded
that a ban on Arizona officials "acting" in a language other than English violates the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states because it impinges on the fundamental right
to participate equally in the political process and the right to petition the government. Ruiz
v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1002 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). Languagebased regulation may also raise equal protection issues. See Kevin R. Johnson & George A.
Martinez, Discriminationby Proxy: The Case of Proposition227 and the Ban on Bilingual
Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1248 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court in Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) prohibited national origin discrimination against
non-English speaking students, and "treated non-English speaking ability as a substitute for
race, color, or national origin."). An examination of an equal protection claim is beyond the
scope of this Paper, but this issue emphasizes the speech and political rights at stake.
99. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA L.J.
261, 279 (1998) (quoting Fishman, The Sociology of Language:An InterdisciplinarySocial
Science Approach to Language in Society, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE,
217, 219).
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that the choice of language is closely intertwined with content, as well as
culture and meaning. This association calls into question whether language
is a content-neutral means of distinguishing antitrust markets or is infused
with content-based criteria and should be subject to a strict scrutiny.
C.

Benefits andBurdens Imposed by DistinguishingRadio Markets
by the Broadcast'sLanguage: Distinctive Content of SpanishLanguageBroadcasts
Programming content and language are often intertwined. For
example, original programming broadcast in Spanish seeks to serve its
audience through news, public affairs, and entertainment programming
geared toward that audience. Though a market definition based on a radio
broadcast's language may encompass any subject matter or viewpoint,
Spanish-language media often conveys a different message than Englishlanguage media. This indicates that the criteria used to identify which
broadcasters fall within the Spanish-language radio market definition are
infused with content.
In determining that the must-carry regulations were not based on
content or viewpoint, the Court in Turner I determined that the must-carry
regulations imposed burdens and conferred benefits without reference to
the content of speech. 00 Congress imposed the must-carry rule on all but
the smallest cable operators, regardless of the content of their broadcasts.'0 '
The rules required cable operators to carry all full-power, over-the-air
stations, regardless of the content of their programs. 0 2 The Court
concluded, "[n]othing in the Act imposes a restriction, penalty, or burden
by reason of the views,
programs, or stations the cable operator has
03
select."'
will
or
selected
In defense of the market definition, the government might argue that it
is defined by language, not the underlying content of the programming.
However, language is not a neutral layer that can be peeled away from
content. Original programming intertwines content and language so that the
language is one manifestation of distinctive content. Many audience
members listen to or watch Spanish-language media because of the distinct
content it offers. Not only is the content conveyed in Spanish, but the news
and public affairs information is more specifically tailored to the interests
100. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 642. Professor McDonald suggests assessing "whether the
government's interests (the benefits to society) justify or warrant the claimed infringement
(the costs to individual and societal interests of the First Amendment)." McDonald, supra
note 62, at 1413.
101. See TurnerI,512 U.S. at 661.
102. Id.at 630-31 (cable operators are required to carry the signals of all "full-power"
television broadcasters).
103. Id.at644.
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of Spanish-speaking audiences. When the first twenty-four-hour Spanishlanguage station began broadcasting in Seattle, Washington in 2002, the
station managers expressed their desire that "listeners [could now] be
as well as informed about an immigration law or local police
entertained
shooting. ' ' 1°4
The relationship between language, culture, and content is
exemplified by the role Spanish-language and bilingual radio stations
played in spreading the news of the pro-immigrant protest marches in 2006.
In Los Angeles, Spanish-language radio disc jockeys ("DJs") played a key
role in attracting more than 500,000 people to a peaceful demonstration on
March 25, 2006.05 The protesters rallied against a bill then pending in
Congress proposing to make undocumented immigrants and those who
assist them felons and to build a 700-mile fence along the U.S.-Mexico
border. 10 6 After a Los Angeles summit, Spanish-language DJs agreed to
promote7 the marches on the air and to urge participants to bring American
flags.

10

In urging people to attend the pro-immigrant rallies, the DJs did more
than "report the news." They used the medium to inform people of
upcoming events and to encourage participation in the marches to support
immigrants' rights. 0 8 Professor Felix Gutierrez observed that the "strong
advocacy of the disc jockeys and other Spanish-language media contrasted
sharply with other outlets."' 0 9 Gutierrez commented, "[They] played it
more as how will this affect you, how will it affect your job, how will it
affect your kids. . .They were much closer to the audience in terms of
direct effect.""10 These examples demonstrate the "pull" factors that draw
audiences to Spanish-language programming because of its unique content,
tailored to the interests of Spanish-speaking and Latino audiences.

104. Castafteda Paredes, supra note 18, at 9.
105. Teresa Watanabe & Hector Becerra, The Immigration Debate: How DJs Put
500,000 Marchers in Motion, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2006, at Al.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Encouraging massive turnout at the demonstrations may have also served the
interests of the corporations such as Univision, whose DJs urged people to attend. It
manifested the size of the audience of those radio stations, making companies like
Univision, which shortly thereafter put itself up for sale to private equity bidders, a more
attractive acquisition target.
109. Watanabe & Becerra, supra note 107, at All.
l10. Id. at5.
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Audiences may also tune to Spanish-language and bilingual media to
escape stereotypes of Latinos on English-language television." 1 A study by
the National Hispanic Academy for the Arts and Children Now found that
in 2001, Latinos constituted only two percent of primetime television
characters, down from three percent the previous year. 1 2 Of the forty-eight
Latinos on primetime, forty percent were classified as tertiary characters,
not relevant to the plot, while Latinos in nonrecurring roles were portrayed
in lower socio-economic status occupations compared to primary and
secondary characters. 1 3 Similar trends were found in a 2004 study of
Latinos on primetime television. 1 4 After surveying the ethnic landscape of
over 100 primetime sitcoms, dramas, reality shows, news magazines, and
other programs, researchers determined that nearly forty percent of all
primetime programs had all-white regular casts." 5 The study, spanning
three years, indicated that the number of Latino regular characters
decreased slightly, even as the Latino population has grown."16
Even when Latinos are portrayed, they are often typecast to conform
to preconceived images. ABC's Ugly Betty resorted to stereotype in 2007
when one character came home unannounced during the middle of the day
and met for the first time her maid who had worked for her for fourteen
years and spoke English with a pronounced Spanish accent."17 The actor
who played the maid, Liz Torres, was also a regular character on the
television show Gilmore Girls8 where she spoke in perfect American
English and ran a dance studio."
111. See Maria T. Padilla, HispanicsDecry Negative Image in Media; Stereotypes Cause
Many Latinos to Turn to Spanish-LanguageBroadcasts, Leaders Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 12, 1997, at Al.
112. National Hispanic Foundation for the Arts, Prime Time for Latinos: Report II:
2000-2001 Prime Time Television Season (2001), availableat http://www.hispanicarts.org
/Media/REPORT2.pdf.
113. Id.
114. See Chon Noriega & Alison Hoffman, Lookingfor Latino Regulars on Prime-Time
Television: The Fall 2004 Season, UCLA CHICANO STUDIES RES. CTR. REs. REP.No. 4, at 2

(2004), available at http://www.chicano.ucla.edu/press/reports/documents/crr_04Dec2004
_000.pdf.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Ugly Betty (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 7, 2007). Produced by Mexican-bom
Selma Hayek, Ugly Betty is an English-language adaptation of the successful Spanishlanguage soap opera Yo Soy Betty La Fea. See http://abc.go.com/primetime/uglybetty
/index?pn=about (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
118. For a list of Liz Torres' acting credits, see TV Guide, http://www.tvguide.com/cele
brities/liz-torres/190440 (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). See also Russell Robinson, Castingor
Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and AntidiscriminationNorms, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1,
24 (2007) ("[S]tudios cast [actors of color] specifically because of their race and expect
them to perform it, often in line with negative traits historically ascribed to their group.").
"Latinos, Asian Americans and Native Americans are stamped as inherently 'exotic' or
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Professors Mastro and Behm-Morawitz found in their content analysis
of primetime television during the 2002 season that Latino characters had
the heaviest accents on television."19 They noted: "cultivation theory
proposes that long-term exposure to television's stable set of selective
messages ultimately shifts viewers' social perceptions toward the television
version of reality, regardless of its accuracy.' 20 The portrayal of Latinos as
the "youngest, most inappropriately dressed characters, with the heaviest
accents on television" may, in the researchers' view, "ultimately result in a
belief in the authenticity of these characterizations.' 12 1 Entertainment
speech embodies messages about priorities, inclusion, exclusion,
stereotypes, or the lack thereof. These images not only shape perceptions of
may also shape media habits as audiences react to
Latinos, they
22
stereotypes. 1

However, some Spanish-language media are just as likely to employ
stereotypes or archetypes. 23 While Spanish-language media are not free of
the stereotypes that permeate the United States, some watch programs
involving Latino characters or listen to music by Latinos as an alternative
to the exclusion of accented stereotypes that often characterize Englishlanguage media.

'foreign'.. . [which] often requires actors to adopt different mannerisms such as exaggerated
accents." Id. at 25. "Latino actors who speak fluent English report being told to 'fake a
Spanish accent to be more convincingly Hispanic."' Id. (citing Mireya Navarro, Actors in
All-Latino Cast Savor a "HistoricMoment," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at El .)
119. Mastro & Behm-Morawitz, supranote 12, at 125.
120. Id. at 11
121. Id. at 125-26 (citing George Bergner et al., Growing up with Television: Cultivation
Process, in MEDIA EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 43-67 (Jennings Bryant

& Dolf Zillmann, eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2002)).
122. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic commented, "[t]he reigning First Amendment
metaphor-the marketplace of ideas-implies a separation between subjects who do the
choosing and the ideas or messages that vie for their attention." Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression
Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1280 (1992). Instead, "[wie
subscribe to a stock of explanatory scripts, plots, narratives and understandings that enable
us to make sense of-to construct-our social world." Id. Consistent with cultivation
theory, speakers (including broadcasters and advertisers), reinforce existing narratives, and
audiences interpret those messages in light of pre-existing narratives and conceptions.
123. See Jack Glascock & Thomas Ruggiero, Representationsof Class and Gender on
Primetime Spanish-Language Television in the United States, 52 COMMC'NS Q. No. 4, 399
(Fall 2004) (study of Spanish-language telenovelas (prime-time soap operas) found light
skinned characters were represented more frequently and in major roles, whereas dark
skinned characters when they were shown at work appeared primarily in service jobs or as
law enforcement).
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Nor is English-language news programming neutral in its treatment of
Latinos. English-language "news discourses continue to marginalize
Latinas/os as sources and subjects.' 2 4 In its annual *"NetworkBrownout
Report," the National Association of Hispanic Journalists ("NAHJ")
reviewed the Vanderbilt University Television News Archives, analyzing
two weeks' of news coverage in 2005 on ABC, NBC, and CBS. 125 They
found that out of an estimated 12,600 stories aired by the big three
networks, only 0.8% were exclusively about Latinos or Latino-related
issues. 126 The top five topics for news stories on the big three networks
about Latinos were categorized as "Domestic Government" (twenty
stories), crime (nineteen stories), human interest (eighteen stories),
immigration (fifteen stories), and sports (twelve stories). 127 The previous
year "[i]mages of undocumented immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico
border was a common visual in most stories."' 28 NAHJ's reports indicate
that the time the big three English-language networks devote to news about
Latinos and topics chosen does not reflect the size or contributions of the
U.S. Latino population.
Professor Juan F. Perea commented, "Latinos were rendered invisible
through the lack of portrayal in the visual and print media."' 129 Professor
Hall used the term "regimes of representation" to refer to the "repertoire of
imagery and visual effects through which 'difference' is represented at any
one historical moment.' 30 Professor Del Rio observed that the "dominant,
historical regime of representation for Latinas/os consists of invisibility,
marginalization, and negative stereotypes.' 13 1 These content-based regimes
of representation create "push" factors driving audiences from some
English-language media to Spanish-language media.
The Pew Hispanic Center's 2004 study of both Spanish- and Englishspeaking Latinos and their media usage revealed that forty-four percent of

124. Del Rio, supra note 13, at 402 (citing Paula M. Poindexter, Laura Smith, L., & Don
Heider, Race and Ethnicity in Local Television News: Framing, Story Assignments and
Source Selections, 47 J. OF BROAD. AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA 524-536 (2003)).
125. Daniela Montalvo & Joseph Torres, Network Brownout Report: 2006, Nat'l Ass'n
of Hispanic Journalists, availableat http://www.nahj.org/resources/2006Brownout.pdf.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.
128. Subvervi et al., supra note 11, at 12. See also Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race,
118 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1563 (2005) (using social cognition research to argue that local
news, referring to English-language news, contains stereotypes of race that serve to
reinforce pre-conceived ideas about race and group identity).
129. Juan Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
965, 966 (1995).
130. Stuart Hall, The Spectacle of the "Other" in REPRESENTATION: CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES 223-290 (S. Hall, ed., 1997).
131. Del Rio, supranote 13, at 390.
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Latinos believe that English-language media contribute to a negative image
of Latinos in the United States. 132 This concern is highest
33 among Latinos
media.1
English-language
from
news
their
of
all
get
who
The absence or stereotyping of Latino characters on English-language
television may also drive viewers to watch Spanish-language television or
listen to Spanish-language radio to catch a glimpse of their culture or to
learn about topics relevant to Latinos. Professor Castafieda Paredes
observed that many American-born Latinos consume the media products
their parents or grandparents use (including media in Spanish) in a search
for "cultural content and ethnic identification.' 3 4 The Pew Hispanic Center
found that coverage of news from Latin America is the strongest draw for
use of Spanish-language media. 31 One study of Univision's newscasts
found that news from Latin America constituted forty-five percent of its
news topics.' 36 Additionally, fifteen percent of Univision's television news
stories were about U.S. Latinos, 137 a far higher number than observed on
U.S. English-language networks. While this may reflect Univision's
"transnational and transcontinental approach to Hispanic culture,"' 138 it also
indicates that its content is distinctive. Berta Castafier, News Director of the
Chicago Univision affiliate stated, "We serve the needs nobody else will,
We give them [the audience] information
because they don't have 'to...
39
they can't get elsewhere.'
A 2007 study the FCC commissioned as part of its review of media
ownership rules revealed that between 2002 and 2005, after ABC, NBC,
CBS, and stations owned and operated by Fox, Spanish-language television
stations owned by or affiliated with Telemundo were on average the fifth
largest providers of news, followed by Univision in sixth place and TV
Azteca in seventh place.' 40 Telemundo stations provided an average of 2.6
hours of news per day during the two weeks per year studied, while
Univision broadcast 2.3 hours per day, and TV Azteca television broadcast

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Suro, supra note 11, at 3.

Id.
Castafleda Paredes, supra note 18, at 8.
Suro, supra note 11, at 13.
Id.
America Rodriguez, Objectivity and Ethnicity in the Production of the Noticero

Univision, 13 CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS. COMM. 66-68 (1996).

138. Arlene Divila, Latinos Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People 159 (2001).
139. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 146.
140. Shiman, supra note 7, n. 19, Table 1-4, pg.I-35.
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1.9 hours of news per day. 14 1 Those stations, which primarily broadcast
Spanish-language programming, provided more news minutes than Public
Broadcasting System (PBS) which averaged 1.8 hours of news daily during
the study period, and almost twice as many news minutes as the former
UPN, which averaged twenty-nine minutes of news daily and WB, which
averaged thirty-eight minutes a day. 142 Thus, the "big seven networks" for
news in the United States include three Spanish-language networks.
This significant commitment to news by Spanish-language television
stations not only informs viewers, it increases democratic engagement.
Professors Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel found that local Spanishlanguage television news increases Latino voting. 143 Like the editorial
which the Supreme Court accorded the highest rung of First Amendment
protection in League of Women Voters,'" this is exactly the democratic
participation the First Amendment seeks to engender and First Amendment
analysis should safeguard.
The radio industry is facing competition from other sources such as
satellite radio, portable music players and online music sources and its
listening audience has declined somewhat, especially among young
people. 45 However, Hispanic radio listening increased by one percent
between 2002 and 2006 for all Hispanic age groups except men ages 18-24
and teenage Latinas. 146
For Latino adults, fifty-eight percent reported getting some news from
the radio on an average weekday, reflecting greater reliance on radio as a
news source than for the U.S. population overall. 147 Of Latino radio
listeners, forty-three percent get their news from English-language radio,
while thirty-four percent get their news from Spanish-language radio and
twenty-three percent get their news from both English- and Spanishlanguage stations. 48 For foreign-born Latinos living in the United States,

141. Id. n.19, pg. 1-17, 1-35. Data calculations by Professor Sandoval based on Shiman's
table 1-4 (divide total news minutes reported in table 1-4 by 14 for the number of days
recorded in the study to derive the number of news minutes per network per day, then divide
that number by 60 to express those minutes in hours.)
142. Id.
143. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Joel Waldfogel, Media Markets and Localism: Does Local
News en Espahol Boost Hispanic Voter Turnout? (HARvARD BuSINESS SCHOOL WORKING

PAPER No. 07-062, 10 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2317.pdf.
144. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 380, 381.
145. See Arbitron, Radio Today 2008 Edition at 86 (2008), available at
www.arbitron.com/downloads/radiotoday08.pdf.
146. Arbitron, Hispanic Radio Today 2007 Edition at 56, available at
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/hispanicradiotoday07.pdf
147. Suro, supra note 11, at 12-13.
148. Id.
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fifty-six percent get their radio news in Spanish, 149 indicating that fortyfour percent are using English-language radio for their news. These
statistics emphasize that many Latinos rely on both English and Spanish
media, and highlight the public stake in any regulation of broadcast speech.
If audiences are driven to Spanish-language media by English-language
media's stereotyping or lack of inclusion of Latino characters, or to
Spanish-language media's distinctive entertainment or news programming,
audiences are in fact choosing Spanish-language media for its content or
even its viewpoint. Spanish-language media is not simply a translation of
English-language media but offers something different. Content and
language are tightly interwoven. In this manner, regulation of competition
within a language is regulation of content, mandating strict scrutiny to
ensure that the means are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
One factor in determining the contours of an antitrust submarket
150
requires identification of a product's "peculiar characteristics and uses."
While audience use of Spanish-language stations to receive programming
or information tailored to the interests of Spanish-speaking and Latino
listeners or viewers may indicate that the product has "peculiar
characteristics or uses," that distinctiveness represents the essence of
protected First Amendment values. The close relationship between content
and the broadcast's distinctiveness suggest the need for constitutional
scrutiny of potential content-based regulation.
A radio or television broadcast often involves speech about news and
public affairs, which has been given the highest rung of First Amendment
protection. 15 1 In its 2007 approval of the private equity consortium BMP's
acquisition of Univision, the FCC commented:
Because journalistic or editorial discretion in the presentation of news
and public information is the core concept of the First Amendment's
free press guarantee, licensees are entitled to the broadest discretion in
the scheduling, selection and presentation of news programming.152
Public policy relies on broadcast station owners with "respect to
diversification of content . . . editorial comment and the presentation of

149. Id.
150. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
151. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 365 (holding that opinions about
controversial issues of public importance have always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values).
152. UVN BMP MO&O, supra note 4, at 5856 (citing NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101,
1112-13, 1119-20, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
124 (1973)).
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news.""' Speech and the protections of the First Amendment underlie
broadcasters' ability and duty to control the messages communicated on
their stations.
In the context of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court deferred
to Congress's judgment that the ability to read or understand Spanishlanguage newspapers, radio, and television is as effective a means of
obtaining political information as the ability to read English. 15 4 The vital
role of Spanish-language media in informing people of news and public
affairs underscores the need to balance the government's purported interest
in protecting competition based on its conception of a radio market
separated by program language with its effect on speech. Two sets of
speech rights are at stake: that of the broadcaster who wishes to transmit a
message in Spanish, and that of the audience that wishes to receive such
messages.
D.

The Public 's Interest in Broadcasters'Speech

Language-based regulations of speech restrict not only the speaker's
discretion in communicating a message, but also the ability of the potential
recipient of that speech to hear the message. In Ruiz v. Hull, the Arizona
Supreme Court expressed concern that an ordinance requiring the State of
Arizona to "act" only in English would have severe consequences not only
for Arizona's public officials and employees, "but also for the many
thousands of persons who would be precluded from receiving essential
information from government employees and elected officials in Arizona's
governments.', 5 5 The Ruiz court expressed concern that the amendment
"deprives limited- and non-English speaking persons of access to
information . . . when multilingual access may be available and may be
necessary to ensure fair and effective delivery of governmental services to
non-English speaking persons."' 56 Professor Perea observed, "[s]ometimes
[Latinos] are silenced through prohibitions on the use of Spanish."' 5 7 Such
restrictions not only mute the speaker, they also deprive the listener of the
opportunity to hear that speech and incorporate it into their speech.
In Yniguez, the Ninth Circuit stressed the First Amendment interests
of the potential recipients of speech in holding a ban on state speech in a
153. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 938 (1973).
154. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 (1966).
155. Ruiz, 957 P.2d at 991.
156. Id at 997. See also, Initiative Petition No. 366, 46
Oklahoma ballot initiative that would require all Oklahoma
proceedings and meetings be in English unconstitutionally
freedom to petition the government for redress, as well as
making function).
157. Perea, supra note 1519, at 966.

P.3d 123 (Ok. 2002) (holding
state documents, transactions,
infringes freedom of speech,
upon the legislature's policy-
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language other than English to be unconstitutional." 8 The Ninth Circuit
commented:
[i]t is frequently the need to convey information to members of the
public that dictates the decision to speak in a different tongue. If all
state and local officials and employees are prohibited from doing so,
receive much
Arizonans who do not speak English will be unable to
lives.159
and
needs
daily
their
concerning
information
essential
In holding that regulation of language is regulation of content, the Ninth
Circuit observed that, "[t]o call a prohibition that precludes the conveying
of information to thousands of Arizonans in a language they can
comprehend a mere regulation of 'mode of expression' is to miss entirely
60
the basic point of First Amendment protections."'
The Supreme Court emphasized in R.A. V. v. St. Paul that the "First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on
1 61
While
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."
regulating by language does not appear to disfavor any subject, it limits
those who choose to express their ideas through a particular idiom.
Broadcasters would have to choose whether to program in English (or
possibly in a bilingual format depending on how much Spanish is spoken)
to avoid the narrowly defined Spanish-language market. Firms may be
dissuaded from specializing in Spanish-language programming because the
smaller market size and number of participants limits a broadcaster's
ability to grow more than if it broadcast in the larger "English-language
market" or in both languages.1 62 These incentives create a burden on speech
in Spanish that is greater than the burden on English-language broadcasters
because the smaller Spanish-language market as defined makes it more
difficult to grow by providing more Spanish-language programming.
158. Yniguez, 69 F.3d at 920.
159. Id. at 936.
160. Id.
161. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377, 391, 394 (citing Simon & Schuster v. Members of New
York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Ark, Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987)).
162. Many broadcasters air programming in Spanish and English such as Entravision,
Univision, Clear Channel, Liberman, Bustos Media, Border Media Partners, SBS, and Radio
One, Multicultural. For a list of arbitron-rated stations by format and owner, see
Radioandrecords.com (select "format," follow the hyperlink to select a market such as
Dallas, San Antonio, Seattle or Chicago). Broadcasters may air programming in different
languages to reach a broader range of listeners and advertisers in a market. Defining an
antitrust broadcast market by language creates incentives to avoid concentration in Spanish
since it will limit a broadcaster's ability to grow by acquiring other stations that also
program in Spanish.
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While the DOJ's intent may have been to ensure a competitive
Spanish-language radio market, 163 the DOJ's market definition may
actually discourage firms from providing Spanish-language programming
through several stations in a geographical market. If a broadcaster wants to
specialize in Spanish in a geographic market, the market definition limits
its expansion alternatives. If the broadcaster already controls several
stations in a market, it can convert some or all of those stations to another
language without any regulatory approvals. If, however, it needs to acquire
another station to expand its program offerings and that proposed
acquisition requires antitrust approval, the small number of broadcasters
defined as Spanish-language market participants and concomitant high
market shares will make it very difficult for a Spanish-language
broadcaster to expand by acquiring a station already programmed in
Spanish. For example, in requiring that Clear Channel divest its stations
currently programmed in Spanish in Houston, Las Vegas and San Francisco
as a condition of approval of the equity firm buyout of Clear Channel, the
DOJ found in February 2008 that "Clear Channel and Univision's
combined Spanish-language listener share exceeds 75 percent in Houston,
73 percent in Las Vegas, and 70 percent in San Francisco."'" These high
market shares are a consequence of the fact that only three firms broadcast
in Spanish in Houston and garner enough audience members for the
Arbitron rating service to report their rankings, and four firms have such
rating levels in San Francisco. 5
Consequently, if the deal requires antitrust approval, a Spanishlanguage broadcaster can only expand in a geographical market if it intends
to provide more Spanish-language programming by changing the format of
stations it already controls or acquiring stations which currently broadcast
163. Univision HBC Complaint, supra note 2, at 10.
164. Bain, Clear Channel Complaint,supra note 2, at 35.
165. See, e.g., Radio & Records, http://www.radioandrecords.com/RRWebsite/ (follow
"ratings" hyperlink; then follow "Houston" hyperlink) (showing that Houston, Texas as of
May 2007 has eight stations broadcasting in Spanish or Latin formats with ratings high
enough to be reported by Arbitron, broadcast by three companies: Univision, Clear Channel
and Lieberman) (last visited April 14, 2008); see, e.g., Radio & Records,
http://www.radioandrecords.com/RRWebsite/ (follow "ratings" hyperlink; then follow "San
Francisco" hyperlink) (showing that San Francisco, California as of April 2008 has seven
stations broadcasting in Spanish or Latin formats with ratings high enough to be reported by
Arbitron, broadcast by four companies: Univision, Clear Channel, SBS and San Joaquin)
(last visited April 14, 2008). Although the data indicates that some broadcasters are able to
offer more than one Spanish-language station in a market, the market definition limits the
acquisition and sale options for those broadcasters to a greater extent than English-language
broadcasters who have similar market shares because there are more market participants in
the English-language market as currently defined. This is true even though some
broadcasters such as Clear Channel offer programming in both English and Spanish and sell
advertising packages that cross languages.
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in English, and are thus classified as participating in a different market.
Stations currently programmed in the English language are likely to sell for
more than stations with comparable audience ratings broadcasting in
pays more for English-speaking
Spanish because the advertising industry
166
audiences.
than Spanish-speaking
The increased costs of growth for Spanish-language broadcasters as
compared to English-language broadcasters indicate that the "reasonable
alternatives" are not equivalent. Those restrictions would also affect
broadcasters when they want to sell or trade stations with other
broadcasters. If the broadcaster wants to sell a radio station currently
programmed in Spanish to another company that also broadcasts in Spanish
in that geographic market, the market definition would regulate that
transaction if the deal is valued above the dollar threshold that requires
DOJ antitrust approval.
The role of content in the market definition is illustrated by
contrasting its effects to content-neutral regulations such as a city's
prohibitions against posting signs on public property. In Members of City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayersfor Vincent, the Court stressed that the
City's proscriptions against posting signs were "neutral," indeed "silent" as
to the viewpoint expressed in the signs; all signs were prohibited from
167
being affixed to the City's property, regardless of what they said. The
Supreme Court in Taxpayers for Vincent stressed the even-handedness of
of the regulation against signs on public utility poles and
the application
16 8
property.
Defining a radio market by language distinguishes between
programming in Spanish and English as if the signs in Taxpayers for
Vincent were distinguished based on the language used to express their
166. Stations programmed in English are often more expensive to buy because
advertisers pay more to reach non-minority audiences, resulting in higher station values
when stations are sold based on a multiple of revenues earned. See Philip M. Napoli,
Audience Valuation and Minority Media: An Analysis of the Determinants of the Value of
Radio Audiences, 46 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 169, 181 (2002) (finding that
stations whose audiences were more than fifty percent racial or ethnic minorities earned less
advertising revenues than those whose audiences were predominantly nonminority). Forcing
Spanish-language broadcasters to grow by purchasing the assets of an English-language
station raises their capital costs as compared to English-language broadcasters who may
grow by buying either English or Spanish-programmed stations.
167. Members of City Counsel of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984).
168. Id. at 804. See also David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral
Standardsfor the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 220-21 (1987).
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message. The effect of the market definition is to permit less speech in
Spanish than in English, as if the ordinance in Vincent permitted fewer
signs to be erected in Spanish than in English. While not expressly based
on the "content" expressed in the signs, the distinction would be made
based on the content of the sign as indicated by the language the speaker
chose to express her message. That limitation extends beyond the effects
(visual clutter of the signs or the need to promote competition) to the
content of the messages.
In Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court
invalidated an ordinance which permitted peaceful picketing near the
school regarding school-labor management disputes but prohibited all other
types of peaceful picketing.' 69 "The operative distinction is the message on
a picket sign."' 7 ° The Court emphasized, "the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.''
Effectively, the market definition sets an artificial limit on how much
speech in Spanish a broadcaster can air in a geographic market, unrelated to
how much Spanish-language programming audiences desire. This limit is
also incongruent with the ownership limits imposed by Congress in the
1996 Telecommunications Act.172 Defining a broadcast market by language
may also result in requiring divestitures of stations currently programmed
in the English-language, however, it is easier to reach that threshold if the
station is programmed in Spanish. The DOJ also required Clear Channel to
divest one station currently programmed in English in Houston, and two
stations currently programmed in English in Cincinnati as a condition of
the 2008 approval of the equity firm buyout of Clear Channel, finding
"Clear Channel and CMP's [Cumulus'] combined advertising revenue share
exceeding 37 percent in Houston and 65 percent in Cincinnati.' 73 Based on
the market shares for what is effectively the English-language market, the
DOJ concluded the merger would yield "post-acquisition HHIs of
approximately 2,100 in Houston and approximately 4,700 in Cincinnati."' 74
While this illustrates that defining a market by language may also result in
high concentration levels in the market effectively defined by its Englishlanguage broadcasts, the larger number of broadcasters offering Englishlanguage programming produces lower average HHIs than in the alleged
169. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 1996 Telecomm. Act, supra note 8 at 110 Stat. 110.
173. Bain, Clear Channel Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 5, Sec. III. C.
1. and IV.
174. Bain, ClearChannel Complaint, supranote 2, 32.
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Spanish-language market. Nor does the market definition take account of
cross-selling between languages as broadcasters offer programming and
advertising packages in both languages.
Regulations which impose a financial burden on speech because of its
content operate as a disincentive to speak, raising First Amendment
concerns. 175 This market definition effectively discourages specialization in
Spanish-language broadcasting within a geographical market, creating
disincentives that burden broadcasters and audiences' speech interests.
Nor is it sufficient that broadcasters may expand in other geographic
markets. The 1996 Telecommunications Act permits broadcasters to
control up to eight radio stations in a large market. 76 By permitting more
consolidation for English-format broadcasters within a geographic market
than for Spanish-format broadcasters, the market definition affords more
opportunities for English-language broadcasters to develop and capitalize
on local economies of scale. It also allows English-language broadcasters
to reap the benefits of those economies from the larger English-language
radio market as currently defined, and bring them to the allegedly separate
Spanish-language market. Consequently, the market definition creates a
burden on speech in Spanish that also limits a broadcaster's ability to
finance its growth into other geographic markets.
In R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, the Court quipped, "St. Paul has no such
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.' 77 Drawing antitrust
markets for media by language discourages companies from specializing in
Spanish-language programming in a local market because their growth will
be limited, while ignoring the entry of English-language broadcasters into
Spanish-language
programming.
Effectively,
Spanish-language
broadcasters have one hand tied if they specialize in Spanish, while
English-language broadcasters are free to compete in the alleged "Spanishlanguage market" and have more room to grow in the "English-language
market."
These disincentives affect not only the broadcaster's speech, but the
audience's ability to receive programming, including news and public

175. Simon & Shuster Inc., 505 U.S. at 117 (1991).
176. 1996 Telecomm. Act, supranote 8 at 110 Stat. 110.
177. R.A. V., 506 U.S at 392.
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affairs, in Spanish or other non-English languages."' The First Amendment
protects the communication, its source, and its recipient. 7 9 The interests of
the recipients, especially those who rely on Spanish-language broadcasts
for news and public affairs information, highlight the importance of the
First Amendment values at stake in defining the market by language.
E.

Defining a BroadcastMarket by Language is Not a Reasonable
Time, Place or Manner Restriction

The Supreme Court has recognized that "time, place or manner"
restrictions that involve speech may be entitled to intermediate rather than
strict scrutiny. Some regulations have been upheld as reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions where they focused on ameliorating the
negative "secondary effects" of the speech, rather than on regulating the
be justified
speech itself. A regulation of speech may in some instances
80
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court distinguished between
a zoning regulation that applied only to "adult theaters," which sought to
regulate the "effects" of adult theaters on nearby schools and areas where
children were present, as opposed to the actual "content" of the programs
shown therein.18 ' The government evaluated the actual or potential harmful
effects from the proximity of the adult theaters to the schools, justifying the
zoning regulation, despite its effect on speech.
Unlike Renton, the "Spanish-language radio market" depends on the
premise that the DOJ has correctly defined the market-the area of
potential harm-if competition is unduly constrained. In Renton, the
physical presence of the theaters in relation to the schools defines the zone
of potential concern about "secondary effects." However, the "secondary
effects" justification is circular where the rationale depends on the speech
itself. The government must show more than concern about competition in
Spanish-language radio to prove that a separate Spanish-language radio
market exists.

178. See Bd. of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("the right to receive ideas
is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom").
179. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1976).
180. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); McDonald,
supra note 62, at 1306-07 (criticizing this secondary effects rationale emphasizing, "[t]o call
a selective content restriction 'content-neutral' because it purportedly targets the 'secondary
effects' of the speech is oxymoronic-it is by definition targeting effects associated with the
selected type of speech").
181. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41,46-47 (1986).
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Protecting competition within the "Spanish-language radio market"
posits a purpose based on the alleged "effects" of speech in Spanish as a
result of a merger: the effect on competition, rather than the content of the
speech itself. Though the acquisition of monopoly power is an undesirable
consequence, those presumed "effects" do not also delineate the market.
The DOJ has the burden of proving the existence of a "Spanish-language
media market," and cannot presume such a market to regulate its alleged
consequences.
The Supreme Court emphasized that in order to be classified as
content-neutral, regulations concerning speech must provide "reasonable
alternative avenues of communication."' 82 In Turner I, the Supreme Court
relied in part on the fact that cable companies could not "avoid or mitigate
its [must-carry] obligations under the [Cable] Act by altering the
to conclude that the must-carry
programming it offers to subscribers"
83
content-neutral.1
were
regulations
The opposite is true for an antitrust market defined by language. A
broadcaster's choice to air solely Spanish-language programming brings it
squarely within a more restrictive market definition. If the broadcaster
chooses to air a mix of Spanish- and English-language content, depending
on how much English it uses, the broadcaster may shift to a larger market
with fewer antitrust restrictions on expansion. If a broadcaster switched to
English-language programming, it would move to a large market that
would permit more expansion. By changing its programming, a broadcaster
could avoid the harsh effects of this regulation and enjoy greater latitude to
expand.
A language-based market definition effectively tells broadcasters
'change the language of your content and you will not be subject to this
classification.' However, a program's language is often inextricably linked
with the content itself. Where it is original content designed and tailored for
those who wish to watch or listen in that language, its messages are
distinct, not a mere translation of a message in another language. The
inability to escape an artificially restrictive market definition except by
changing program language (and, thereby program content) is
quintessential content-based regulation. Despite the lack of apparent
animosity toward particular views, the language-based market definition
creates incentives and disincentives to broadcast content as indicated by the
182. Id. at 42 (approving city's decision to prohibit adult theaters from locating 1,000
feet from a school, but allowing them to do business in certain designated locations).
183. Turner 1,512 U.S., at 644.
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language chosen to express that content. A government's otherwise
content-neutral regulations that affect programming are "subjected to
demanding First
Amendment scrutiny because of their direct impact on
" 4

programming.

8

Spanish-language broadcasters can only escape this regulation by
changing the language and with it the likely content of their broadcasts or
by ceasing to be radio broadcasters. Those who choose to transmit their
messages through another means such as the Internet are not acting as
"radio broadcasters" within the FCC's or the DOJ's definition of the media
market and would be competing in a fundamentally different medium and
market. 85 Those who choose to air Spanish-language programming on the
radio twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, could not escape the
market definition by broadcasting Spanish-language content at another
time, or in another place or manner. For radio broadcasters, no matter the
time of the show, nor where an operator broadcasts on the spectrum
designated by the FCC for "radio," the market definition would apply
because of the language of the broadcast.
Accordingly, the market definition creates disincentives to specialize
in non-English languages. The best way to avoid the potential limits to
growth posed by the narrow market definition is to stop providing minority
language broadcast content, or at least to not specialize in such
programming. This Hobson's choice places a burden on speech in Spanish
or other minority languages that the broadcaster might otherwise choose to
provide.
In contrast, the adult theaters in Renton were allowed to locate within
the 520 acres designated in the zoning plan for such uses and were only
prohibited from locating near schools. 186 The zoning regulation in Renton
merely restricted the "time, place or manner" of speech. Upon remand in
Turner BroadcastingSystem v. FCC ("Turner JJ)187 the Court concluded

184. Preferred Commc'n Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.

1994).
185. Susannah Fox & Gretchen Livingston, Latinos Online, Hispanics with lower levels
of education and English proficiency remain largely disconnected from the internet, Pew
Hispanic Center, (March 14, 2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/73.pdf
(noting that in 2006, fifty-six percent of Latino adults used the Internet, compared to

seventy-one percent of non-Hispanic whites and sixty percent of non-Hispanic blacks. For
Spanish-dominant Latinos, thirty-two percent use the Internet, indicating that it is not a
substitute for radio and television.); See also Leonard M. Baynes, Race, Media
Consolidation and Online Content: The Lack of Substitutes Available to Media Consumers
of Color, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 199, 202 (2006) (noting that the Internet is not a direct

substitute for radio and television for people of color including Latinos and AfricanAmericans).
186. City of Renton, 475 U.S., at 53.
187. Turner Broad. Inc. v. FCC (Turnerl), 520 U.S. 180 (1996).
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that the actual effects of the regulations on the cable companies' speech
were modest; cable operators had been able to satisfy their must-carry
obligations eighty-seven percent of the time using previously unused cable
channel capacity. 8 8 The Turner It majority felt that this burden was
congruent to the benefits it afforded: preserving free over-the-air
for the forty percent of Americans who did not subscribe to
broadcasting
189
cable.
Unlike cable operators who could fulfill must-carry obligations to
over-the-air broadcasters by using available capacity, radio broadcasters
must make a one-for-one substitution to switch radio formats. The old
programming is displaced in favor of the new. Currently, radio
broadcasters have a limited amount of capacity to transmit one message at
a time. Full-time Spanish-language broadcasters proposing transactions
subject to prior antitrust approval cannot escape the market definition
unless they switch some or all of their Spanish-language broadcasts to
English. The lack of reasonable alternatives for those in the alleged
Spanish-language radio market calls into question not only the means
chosen to implement this definition, but also whether the market definition
is content-based and subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. Even if it is
content-neutral and requires intermediate scrutiny, the ability of
broadcasters to provide programming in both languages and sell packages
to advertisers that straddle language calls into question whether the
classification burdens "substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interests."' 90
Furthermore, broadcast speech in Spanish is an example of what the
First Amendment prizes, not what it proscribes. Unlike fighting words or
itself does not fall within the category of
obscenity, the Spanish-language
"proscribable speech;"' 19' it embodies the very diversity that the First
Amendment values. We should be particularly cautious of claims of
"secondary effects" arising from our most valued speech, including that
about news and public affairs. Though preventing monopoly or undue
concentration is a recognized statutory goal, it cannot be accomplished at
the expense of unduly limiting protected speech.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at214.
Id. at 215-16.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
Cf. R.A.V., 506 U.S. at 384-85.
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IV. MARKET STRUCTURE, SUBSTITUTION, LIKELIHOOD OF
ENTRY, AND COMPELLING OR SUBSTANTIAL STATE INTEREST

A.

ProductSubstitution

To demonstrate that the government has a compelling interest or a
substantial interest (under a strict or intermediate scrutiny standard,
respectively) in defining a broadcast market by the language of the
programming, the government must first substantiate its claim that
language defines the relevant broadcast market. The government bears the
burden of proof that it has established the contours of the antitrust
market. 92 This should include evidence that other products are not a
substitute for Spanish-language radio. It must also include an analysis of
the likelihood that competitor entry into the alleged market will ameliorate
potential anticompetitive effects arising from the merger.
In antitrust terms, the test of market definition turns on reasonable
substitutability. 93 This requires the court to determine whether or not
products have "reasonable interchangeability" based upon "price, use and
qualities."' 94 The district court in U.S. v. Oracle stressed that these
differences must be based on more than customer preferences.' 9 The DOJ
defines the relevant market as "the smallest collection of products and
geographic areas within
which a hypothetical monopolist would raise
' 96
prices significantly."'
"Defining the relevant market is critical in an antitrust case because
the legality of the proposed merger in question almost always depends
upon the market power of the parties involved."' 97 Market power is based
98
on the ability to control prices and deter entry within the relevant market.'
How the market is conceptualized often determines whether the merger

192. "Determination of relevant product market is a fact question for which the burden
of proof rests on the plaintiff." General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz, 810 F.2d 795, 805 (8th Cir.
1987); United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997). See also
Sandoval, supra note 9, at 445-47 (questioning whether the DOJ met the standard for
demonstrating a submarket under Brown Shoe v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325).
193. U.S v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956).
194. U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing E. L du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 404).
195. Id.
196. See DOJ and FTC, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,

Overview of Guidelines Analysis (March 2006), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov
/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm [hereinafter Merger Guidelines Commentary].
197. Oracle, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1123.
198. See E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 392 (market power isthe ability to
control prices or exclude competition).
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will be viewed as likely to lessen competition. 99 Professor Shelanski
market share is only as strong as the
observed that "a calculation 2of
°°
definition."
market
underlying
The market definition used in the HBC/Univision merger was based
in part on the DOJ's conclusion that Spanish- and English-language radio
were not adequate demand substitutes. 20 ' As it did in analyzing the private
equity buyout of Clear Channel, the DOJ cited its conclusions that a
substantial number of advertisers in the relevant geographic market
"consider Spanish-language radio, either alone or as a complement to other
media, to be the most effective way to reach their target audience, and do
not consider other media, including non-Spanish-language radio, to be a
reasonable substitute. '2 2 The DOJ did not reveal the source of these
conclusions but they were likely based on interviews with unidentified
advertisers and market participants and a review of undisclosed documents.
For both the Clear Channel private equity buyout and the HBC/Univision
merger, the DOJ averred that advertisers would not switch to Englishlanguage media if prices were to rise postmerger.20 3 The nature of the
advertiser and other witness statements about the product substitutability
would have to be examined in more detail if the market definition were
challenged in court.2°
Perceptions of product substitution should also be analyzed in light of
the economic interests of those interviewed. Professor Divila, in Latinos
Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People, points out that some
advertising agencies stress the use of the Spanish-language as a
199. In the analysis of the potential merger between Staples and Office Depot, the
district court observed, "[a]s with many antitrust cases.. .this case hinges on the proper
definition of the relevant product market." F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073
(D.D.C. 1997).
200. Shelanski, supra note 1, at 409.
201. Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 15, at 4-5.
202. Bain ClearChannel Complaint, supra note 5, 22.
203. Id. Univision had a substantial equity investment in Entravision which Univision
was required to reduce as a condition of approval of its merger with HBC.
204. Professors Sullivan and Grimes criticized the premerger notification and review
process for limiting public access to merger documents and the ability to meaningfully
review DOJ and FTC actions in such cases. "[T]he absence of judicial records and
information from the agencies deprives practitioners and scholars of information with which
to critique enforcement policy." SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 20, at 580. "Current
federal antitrust law does not require disclosure of a premerger filing and strict
confidentiality provisions prevent the agency from disclosing the content of the filing." Id.
In contrast, the FCC posts an exhaustive record of the pleadings and comments filed in its
merger review process, sparingly issuing protective orders to redact information.
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distinguishing factor requiring "special" advertising for Hispanics.2 °5 This
distinctiveness is part of the justification for having advertisers use their
services to reach audiences. Professor Divila commented, "[l]anguage
means money for Hispanic media and marketing agencies, and this
equation is likely to continue to affect the correlation of Latinas with
Spanish, impairing attempts to broaden the media's definition of
Latinas. 2 °6 Thus, an advertising agency's statements that it perceives the
Spanish- and English-language markets as separate also serves its own
economic interests.
Ken Heyer commented that in evaluating a potential merger,
"[c]ustomer views are, however, best employed as a complement to, rather
than as a substitute for, economic analysis., 20 7 The sample of customers
may also affect the validity of the customer data and a court's willingness
to accept these statements as representative of customer views. 20 ' The
public records of the DOJ's analysis of the HBC/Univision merger
settlement and the Clear Channel private equity buyout did not include any
economic analysis or data to assess the validity of the customer sample.
It is common practice for customers to be interviewed regarding their
perceptions of market definition. Heyer notes that "if all customers state
that they have no close alternatives and would continue purchasing roughly
the same quantities of the candidate relevant product even following a
small, but significant and nontransitory increase in price (SSNIP), this
seems to suggest strongly that there is a relevant antitrust product
market. ' '209 However, as the Whole Foods case demonstrates, the
appropriate question is not whether some core customers would refuse to
switch, but whether marginal customers would switch.
In FTC v. Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Markets, the district
court focused on the question Heyer raises: what would customers do when
confronted with price increases? In Whole Foods, the FTC argued that the
relevant market was "premium natural and organic supermarkets," of
which Whole Foods and Wild Oats were the only two national
competitors. 210 The merger parties presented evidence that substantial
205. Ddvila, supra note 1408, at 4, 8, 38, 86.
206. Arlene Ddvila, Mapping Latinidad Language and Culture in the Spanish TV

Battlefront, 1TELEVISION &NEW

MEDIA,

75-94 (2000).

207. Ken Heyer, Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to
Customers, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 87, 87 (2007).
208. See U.S. v. SunGard Data Systems, 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 191-92 (2001) (the
government failed to show that the number of customers who would not shift in light of a
SSNIP was "substantial enough that a hypothetical monopolist would find it profitable to
impose such an increase in price.").
209. Heyer, supra note 211, at 104.
210. F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., 502 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007).
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numbers of their customers engaged in "cross-shopping" for natural and
organic foods, switching between Whole Foods and supermarkets such as
Safeway, for example.2 '
The Whole Foods defendants argued that the "FTC improperly uses
differentiation or uniqueness as the basis to define the market, while the
defendants view differentiation as but one competitive dimension in which
Whole Foods and Wild Oats engage in competition with other firms. 21 2
The district court stressed: "Differentiation, however, does not equate to a
unique relevant product market for antitrust purposes., 213 The question is
whether the differences are so substantial that the merging parties could
retain most of their customers even if, "post-merger, it were to raise price
is not "are there any
or reduce quality?" The determinative question
214
differences?" but "would customers switch.,
In Whole Foods, the district court held that the appropriate question is
not whether "core" customers would switch but whether "marginal
customers" would switch.21 5 In the Whole Foods case, a marginal customer
was defined as "someone who would switch where he or she shops in
response to a SSNIP . . .a small but significant and nontransitory price
increase. 21 6 The district court concluded that the "effect of the proposed
merger on marginal consumers is more important than the effect on such
core consumers, as it is the marginal consumers for whom the stores must
and do vigorously compete. 2 17 Thus, in analyzing whether Spanishlanguage radio competes in a separate market, the appropriate antitrust
question is whether marginal customers would switch to English-language
radio or buy advertising packages that include Spanish and Englishlanguage radio if merging Spanish-language providers instituted a SSNIP.
In its analysis of Oracle's proposed merger with PeopleSoft in 2004,
the district court noted that there was little, if any, customer testimony
about what they would or could do or not do to avoid a price increase post
merger. 218 Instead of interchangeability, the customer witnesses testified
about their preferences.21 9 Preferences toward one product over another do
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.at 16.
Id.at 26.
Id.

Id.
Whole Foods Mkt., 502 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
Id.
Id.at 23.
Oracle, 331 U.S., at 1131.
Id.
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not negate interchangeability. 220 The Oracle court quoted Professor
Pitofsky's observation:
There will almost always be classes of customers with strong
preferences * * * but to reason from the existence of such classes to a
conclusion that each is entitled to * * * a separate narrow
221 market

definition grossly overstates the market power of the sellers.
Thus, the DOJ was unable to block the merger between Oracle and
PeopleSoft in large part because the trial court found that the Justice
Department failed to prove the accuracy of the product and geographic
markets it had alleged in its complaint.222
In analyzing whether parties to a merger could sustain a SSNIP,
countervailing buyer power must also be considered. In U.S. v. Engelhard,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the government did not make a prima facie
case against a proposed merger, noting that "it is possible for only a few
customers who switch to alternatives to make the price increase
unprofitable, thereby protecting a larger number of customers who would
have acquiesced in higher [] prices. 22 3
A review of the top twenty Spanish-language advertisers in 2006
shows that with few exceptions, they are the largest brands in America that
also advertise heavily on English-language media: Procter & Gamble Co.,
AT&T, General Motors, McDonalds, Verizon, Ford Motor Co., Sears,
Toyota Motor Corp., Johnson & Johnson, Wal-Mart, DaimlerChrysler,
Walt Disney, Pepsico, Coca-Cola, Home Depot, and Loreal.224
Broadcasting Media Partners Inc., the company that controlled Univision
until its 2007 sale to a private equity group, was the largest Spanishlanguage advertiser in 2006, but other "brand name" advertisers spent
millions. 25 While there may certainly be small businesses, local panaderias
(bakeries) for example, that may only advertise through Spanish-language
media, their power as customers is dwarfed by the corporate giants listed
above. Large, experienced corporate advertisers could likely resist
unilateral price increases, especially since they also advertise on Englishlanguage media and may buy discounted package deals that cross
languages and formats. Their resistance may benefit small buyers as the

220. Id.
221. Id. (citing Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of the Relevant Market and the Assault
on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1805, 1816 (1990)).
222. Shelanski, supra note 1, at 415 (citing Oracle at 1108, 1175).
223. U.S. v. Engelhard, 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997).
224. Press Release, Nielsen, Spanish-language Advertising Rose 14.4% in 2006,
NIELSEN MONITOR-PLUS REPORTS, May 3, 2007, http://www.nielsenmedia.com (follow

"news" hyperlink; choose "general" and "2007" from drop-down boxes; then scroll down to
"May 3, 2007" for article).
225. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit recognized in Engelhard.226 The power of such large
buyers coupled with the power of consolidated competitors serving several
languages and formats may serve as a check on the ability of Spanishlanguage broadcasters who merge to raise their prices in a significant
fashion.
Regarding substitutability, it is important to look at the options
available to both advertisers and audiences, although the DOJ focuses on
the effect of the merger on the advertiser. Professor Shelanski observed that
"what advertisers view as substitutes may not correspond at all to what
consumers view as substitutes. 2 27 However, the advertisers' primary
objective is to reach their intended audience. If the audience uses radio and
television in both English and Spanish, advertisers and antitrust authorities
must consider to what extent they are substitutes.
There is substantial evidence of audience cross-over between
languages, a fact many advertisers grasp in trying to appeal to Spanishspeaking or Latino customers. 228 Spanish-language media is particularly
important for reaching subsets of the Latino community: Latina women are
the most loyal viewers of the "telenovelas," soap-operas that dominate
daytime television in Spanish in the U.S. 229 Hispanic males surveyed by the
marketing firm Cheskin reported watching slightly more than eleven hours
of each English- and Spanish-language television per week, with Englishlanguage viewing leading by a slight margin. 230 Latino children switch back
and forth between languages, leaning heavily toward English-language
media. 23 1 Television watching is often a family affair for Latinos, who
switch languages and channels to accommodate the range of preferences
within the family. 232 These viewing patterns indicate that many audience

226. See Engelhard, 126 F.3d at 1306.
227. Shelanski, supranote 1, at 406.
228. For example, during the 2007 Super Bowl, Toyota ran a bilingual ad for its 2007
Camry Hybrid. Stephanie Mehta reported that "[i]n the 30-second spot, developed by Conill
(Toyota's Hispanic ad agency), a father speaks to his son in Spanish and English, drawing
comparisons to the car's ability to switch from gas to electric power." Stephanie Mehta,
Speaking the Wrong Language, Marketers Looking to Reach a Lucrative Swath of the U.S.
Hispanic Population Need to Rethink Their Pitch, CNN MONEY.CoM, April 27, 2006
http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/27/news/companies/pluggedinfortune/index.htm.
229. FELIPE KORzENNY & BET'Y ANN KoRZENNY, HISPANIC MARKETING, A CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 261 (2005).
at 260.
230. See id.
at 295.
231. See id.
at 261.
232. See id.
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members "cross-shop" between English, Spanish, and bilingual
programming.
A 2003 study of Hispanic media habits by Yankelovich found that
U.S. Latinos who learned Spanish as their first language divided their
television viewing time almost equally between Spanish- and Englishlanguage programming, with a slight preference for English: 13.64 hours of
English-language television per week as compared to 13.48 hours of
Spanish-language television weekly. 233 Latinos who identified English as
their first language still reported watching 5.21 hours of Spanish-language
programming per week.234 Arbitron, a company that charts radio listening,
found that "Rhythmic Contemporary Hit Radio," an English-language
format, was the third most popular format for Hispanics in 2006, just
behind "Spanish contemporary. 2 35
Although there are some who use media exclusively in one language,
the overlap suggests that for bilingual audiences, substitution between
program languages is more than incidental. The DOJ did not discuss any
analysis of the overlap between listeners to Spanish- and English-language
radio, or the overlap of advertisers. Nor did it address the extent to which
English-language broadcasters compete directly with Spanish-language
broadcasters for audiences and advertisers.
Latino identity (and strategies to reach them), straddles race, ethnicity,
language, region, nationality, citizenship, self, and externally imposed
conceptions. 236 Broadcasters have been instrumental in the creation of a
pan-Latino or Hispanic identity that attempts to bridge U.S. Latino
communities across divides of national origin, race, region, generation, and
language.237 In 1980, the U.S. Census for the first time amalgamated
various ethnic groups under the "Hispanic" category,2 38 calling attention to
the size of this "group," composed of people of Mexican, Puerto Rican,

233. See id.at 109.
234. See id. at 109.
235. Arbitron, HisPANIc RADIo TODAY, How AMERICA LISTENS TO RADIO 19, 28-32, 4042 (2007), available at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/hispanicradiotoday07.pdf
(detailing substantial Hispanic audiences for the English formats "Pop Contemporary Hit
Radio," "Adult Contemporary" and "Country").
236. See Del Rio, supranote 13, at 389-90.
237. See id. at 413 (noting Spanish-language news creates a "Latinidad," a
conceptualization of Latina/o identity "that, in turn, affirms the vitality and legitimacy of the
Latina/o market and television networks such as Univision").
238. Id.at 395; Professors Felipe and Betty Ann Korzenny commented, "The label
Hispanic, as if it were a brand, became the symbolic handle by which everyone could refer
to a population that had been seen as disparate before... a name creates the reality it is
supposed to represent." KoRZENNY & KoRzEtzrNY, supra, note 229, at 287 (2005). This
article uses the terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably.
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Cuban, Central, and South American ancestry. 239 The 2000 Census reported
over thirty-five million Hispanics living in the United States, excluding
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Island areas. 240 As the size of the Hispanic
category has grown, so too has its diversity. This has led some marketers to
stress the need for "segmentation" to reach across Latino categories: onesize and one-language does not fit all.
The characterization of first-generation Latinos as solely consumers
of Spanish-language media is a fallacy. Latinos whose first language was
English spent half of their television viewing time in the year 2000
watching English-language television. 24 1 This indicates that Spanishlanguage broadcasters and those who advertise through them must consider
English-language media as a competitor.
In light of the increasing numbers of Latinos using both English- and
Spanish-language media, Professor Felipe Korzenny, Director of the Center
for Hispanic Marketing Communications at Florida State University,
observed that "network TV, and all mainstream English language
programming, can now compete for a large sector of the Hispanic
market., 242 These trends are resulting in more "segmentation" of media
messages to reach Latino audiences through the range of languages and
243
programs they view. Professor Korzenny counsels advertising agencies
to focus on "cultural commonalities of the Hispanic market rather than be
limited to the Spanish language." 2 "
Some advertisers use Spanish-language media because they believe it
to be more effective in reaching a specific segment of their target audience.
Studies by Roslow Research Group indicate that many Latino audience
2 45
members more readily retain advertising messages in Spanish. Professor
239. Del Rio, supra note 13, at 393 ("Authority often assigns individuals or groups to
categories, whereas identity stems from below."); OSCAR GANDY, COMMUNICATION AND
RACE: A STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 48 (1988); ("While the acceptance of a classification as
a marker of index of one's identity may be enabling, oft it is not.").
240. U.S. Census Bureau, THE HISPANIC POPULATION, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (May 2001),
availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr0 l-3.pdf.
241. KORZENNY & KORzENNY, supra note 229, at 261.
242. See id. at 295. Bilingualism is increasing overall in America. Professor Christina
Rodriguez noted that the Census "projects that by 2044, a majority will speak a language
other than English, though not necessarily to the exclusion of English." Christina Rodriguez,
Language and Participation,94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 692 (2006).
243. See KORZENNY & KORZENNY, supra note 229, at 295.
244. Id.
245. See Roslow Research Group, Spanish vs. English Advertising Effectiveness Among
Hispanics 2, 13 (2000), available at http://www.roslowresearch.com/studies/33.doc; Roslow
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Korzenny observed that superior comprehension or recall of Spanishlanguage ads may be attributed to "the fact that ads in English are not
culturally relevant, not to the language used in those ads. 246
Professor America Rodriguez observed that the "clearly defined
panethnic conceptualization of Hispanic audience, the nexus of which is the
Spanish language, is being challenged., 247 The "overarching cultural
conflation of ethnicity, race, and the 'foreign' Spanish language has been
reinforced in general market media, in both journalistic and fictional
productions, 248 Rodriguez commented. Additionally, "Latino-oriented
Spanish language media marketers also emphasize the Spanish language as
the central identifying characteristic of the Hispanic audience
,249 She
noted that "[fjrom a marketing point of view... [s]egmenting Hispanics by
language use has the potential of producing a more tightly defined
audience, one that is targetable not only by ethnoracial identity but also by
class. 25 °
Professor Divila commented that Latinos have been constructed for
the market so that "the Spanish language is built as the paramount basis of
U.S. Latinidad..." 251 Through this process "Latinos are continually recast
as authentic and marketable, but ultimately as a foreign rather than intrinsic
component of U.S. society, culture and history .
,,252 Similarly,
characterizing Spanish-language radio as a separate antitrust market may
reflect corporate dogmas about the role of Spanish in marketing to U.S.
Hispanics, rather than the actual patterns of advertiser and audience
substitution. Furthermore, it reifies the conception of Spanish-speaking
Latinos as separate, other, and not part of the greater media market. This

Research Group, Spanish vs. English Advertising Effectiveness Among Hispanic Teens 3,
12 (2000), availableat http://www.roslowresearch.com/studies/9 .doc.
246. Spanish, English or Spanglish-That is the Question, UNIVERSIA
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Apr. 20, 2005, http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=
viewfeature&id--950&language=english (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). See also Robinson,
supra note 120, at 56 n.286 (citing Osei Appiah, Black, White, Hispanic and Asian
American Adolescents' Responses to Culturally Embedded Ads, 12 How. J. Comm. 29, 31
(2001) (Hispanic viewers prefer to see ads with Hispanic models)). Ads developed for
Spanish-language television with culturally-based themes using Hispanic actors contribute
to message retention and advertising effectiveness, suggesting that language is not the only
differentiating factor-content and culture are also relevant. See KORZENNY & KORZENNY,
supra note 229, at 88 (cultural representations that connect with the consumer are more
important for effectiveness than language code alone).
247. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 131.
248. Id. at 132.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Dtvila, supra note 1408, at 4.
252. Id.
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separated archetype is at odds with the reality of Latino media usage and
advertisers' efforts to reach them.
In contrast to this conception of a separate Spanish-language or
Hispanic market, in August 2007, Nielsen, which tracks television viewers,
announced it was integrating its reports on Spanish-language television and
Hispanic viewers with its "general television viewer" report, abandoning
2 53 This
the practice of separating the "Hispanic" and "General Market."
rating system provides advertisers with new tools to evaluate audience use
of Spanish- and English-language television, and make decisions about
media buying across languages.
In defining the market, it must also be recognized that audiences and
advertisers have different incentives. Advertisers generally pay less per
audience member to air their messages on Spanish-language stations than
they pay on English-language stations. 25 4 Spanish-language advertising is
generally less expensive than English-language advertising so advertisers
may not view English-language programming as a substitute since it costs
more per audience member.25 5 Whether or not audiences are using both
Spanish- and English-language media, advertisers may have a preference
for the less costly medium.
The reasons cited for the price difference between English- and
Spanish-language media vary; some attribute it to the lower average
income of Spanish-language audience members, more time spent watching
television or listening to the radio, and thus more opportunities to capture
253. See Press Release, Nielsen, Nielsen to Generate NationalRatingsfor Both Englishand Spanish-Language Television from the Same Panel (Aug. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.nielsen.commedia/pr_070827.htnl. In the first week of the "single national
panel" Univision outranked ABC, NBC, CBS, Fox and CW for audience ratings by all
adults 18-34, not just Hispanics. See Press Release, Univision, Univision #1 Network for
Entire Week Beating ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and CW (Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://corp
orate.univision.com/corp/en/pr/Miami 06092007-1 .html.
254. See Napoli, supra note 169, at 181; Cf ARBITRON, RADIO'S LEADING INDICATORS,
AUDIENCE RATINGS AND THEIR IMPACT ON REVENUES, FORMAT CHOICE AFFECTS REVENUE 7

(2005) (finding that in 2005 Spanish radio earned a power ratio, revenue share divided by
audience share, of 0.95 compared to 1.79 for English-language easy listening stations or
at
available
contemporary,
adult
for
1.45
http://arbitron.com/downloads/leadindicator2005.pdf. A power ratio of 1 indicate the radio
station has a good balance of audience share to advertising dollar while a share less than one
indicates it is not reaping ad dollars commensurate to its audience size. Napoli supra note
169, at 172.
255. See SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA AFTER THE UNIvISION-HISPANIC BROADCASTING 39
(Luis V. Nuflez, ed., 2006) [hereinafter SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA]. See also Shelanski,
supra note 1, at 406 ("[W]hat advertisers view as substitutes may not correspond at all to
what consumers view as substitutes.").
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the audience, or that some advertisers do not value Spanish-speaking and
Hispanic customers as much as English-speaking customers.2 5 6 Minority
audiences including Latinos also suffer from advertisers' stereotypes that
keep them from advertising to Hispanics or are used to justify paying less
for any ads.
The FCC documented this in the study it commissioned in 1999
which found that minority-formatted stations earned less for their
audiences, and were often subjected to stereotypes and even edicts against
advertising with them in the form of "No Urban" or "No Spanish"
dictates.257 Such dictates indicate that no matter what the price of the ad or
the popularity of the station, an advertiser will not buy an ad targeted at that
minority group. 258 Professor Divila recounted the experience of an
advertising executive with Zubi Advertising in Coral Gables, Florida (a
firm specializing in Hispanic marketing) who reported that a potential
corporate client "rejected her pitch to advertise a luxury good (which she
declined to name) on the grounds that 'you all came in boats' and could
never afford the product., 259 The advertising executive reflected, "' [i]t just
dawned on me that for him we were all pobretones (shoddy and
260
impoverished).",
For Spanish-language media, price increases are also an attempt to
close the gap between historic payment rates for English- and Spanishlanguage media. Yet, advertisers were still buying. Between 2005 and
2006, advertising spending for Spanish-language media increased 14.4% to
$5.59 billion.261 This increase may be due in part to the power of
companies such as Clear Channel and Univision to leverage their multiple
channels, formats, and geographic markets to demand higher rates.
Telemundo reportedly received higher advertising revenues per its
audience share than Univision.2 62 Luis Nufiez commented, "[p]art of the
explanation for Telemundo's higher ratio of advertising revenues to
audience share [as compared to Univision] is the benefit of being part of a
large English language media company., 263 At the same time, advertising

256. See Kofi Asiedu Ofori, Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, When
Being No. 1 is Not Enough: The Impact of Advertising Practices on Minority-Owned &
Minority-Formatted Broadcast Stations 24-25 (1999) (submitted to the Office of
Communications Business Opportunities, FCC), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus
/MassMedia/Informal/ad-study.
257. See id. at 12.
258. See id.at 25-26, 28.
259. Divila, supranote 1408, at 129.
260. Id.
261. Press Release, Nielsen, supranote 231.
262. See SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA, supra note 262, at 36.
263. Id.
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prices rose overall in the radio industry, with the cost of radio advertising
64
doubling since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.2
The power of consolidated entities with interests in both Spanish- and
English- language programming to close the revenue gap indicates that
although advertisers may wish for the cheapest alternative to reach their
customers, the defining factor for that alternative is not programming
language but industry-wide consolidation. In other words, the ability of
broadcasters to exercise economies of scale across languages indicates that
the power to control prices is most forceful across languages, formats, and
market conceptions, rather than within them.
Even though there are significant differences between Spanish- and
English-language media, broadcasters are increasingly competing for the
same audiences and advertisers. As the district court concluded in Whole
Foods, differentiation "does not, however, indicate that differentiated
supermarkets do not compete with each other; to the contrary, it is how
they compete with each other."265 Many Latinos use English-language
programming, and many traditionally English-language broadcasters offer
Spanish-language and bilingual programming. This dynamic movement
between languages creates alternatives for advertisers that undercut the
conclusion that the markets are separate.
B.

Supply-Side Antitrust Analysis: The Role of Market Entry and
Structure in Proving a Compelling or SubstantialGovernment
Interest

The DOJ based its conclusion in the Univision merger with HBC that
the English- and Spanish-language radio markets are separate in large part
on the assumption that no broadcaster would change its format to Spanish
because of the expenses involved.26 6 Yet, the DOJ and FTC recognize that
competitor entry might ameliorate anticompetitive effects and forestall the
need for additional review of the merger.267 The Agencies stress that "[i]f
the conditions necessary for an anticompetitive effect are not present-for
264. See George Williams, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY, 2007, 15-16 (2007),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A 11.pdf.
265. Whole Foods, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (quoting the testimony of an expert report)
(emphasis in the original).
266. See Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 15, at 8-9. The DOJ also
assumed reformatting of radio stations from programming targeted at other demographics
would not be profitable in its 2008 analysis of the private equity firm buyout of Clear
Channel. Bain, Clear Channel Complaint,supra note 2.
267. See Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 2.
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example, because entry would reverse that effect before significant time
elapsed-the Agencies terminate their review because it would be
unnecessary to address all of the analytical elements. ' '268 Timely entry may
counteract the market power allegedly arising from a merger. Analysis of
the likelihood that entry will deter price increases is fundamental to
demonstrating that the government has either a compelling or substantial
interest requiring remedial action.2 69
In the DOJ and FTC's 2006 Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines Commentary"), the Agencies emphasized
the importance of an "integrated approach" to merger analysis.270 The fivepart structure of the Merger Guidelines: "(1) market definition and
concentration; (2) potential adverse competitive effects; (3) entry analysis;
(4) efficiencies; and (5) failing and exiting assets," are, as the DOJ and
FTC emphasized, not to be considered "as a linear, step-by-step
progression that invariably starts with market definition and ends with
efficiencies or failing assets., 271 The Merger Guidelines Commentary
stressed:
The market definition process is not isolated from the other analytic
components in the Guidelines. The Agencies do not settle on a relevant
market definition before proceeding to address other issues. Rather,
market definition is part of the integrated process by which the
Agencies apply Guidelines principles, iterated as new facts are learned,
to reach an understanding of the merger's likely effect on
competition. 272
Thus, entry analysis should influence market definition as part of an
integrated assessment of the merger's likely competitive effects.
The Agencies noted that
[t]he Guidelines' approach to market definition reflects the separation
of demand substitutability from supply substitutability-i.e., the ability
and willingness, given existing capacity, of firms to substitute from
making one product to producing another in reaction to a price change.
Under this approach, demand substitutability is the concern of market
delineation, while supply substitutability
2 7" and entry are concerned with
current and future market participants.
The DOJ's evaluation of the HBC/Univision merger and the Clear Channel
private equity buyout did not bear the hallmark of such an integrated
approach. The market was defined based on interviews with undisclosed

268. Id.
269. See generally Sandoval, supra note 9, at 437-45 (arguing that entry analysis should
examine factors affecting participation in the alleged "Spanish-language" market).
270. Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 2.
271. Id.
272. Id.at 5.
273. Id.
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advertisers and a document review.274 Market participation was analyzed
under the assumption that no English-language broadcaster would enter the
market to contest incumbent Spanish-language broadcasters for market
share and advertising profits.275 Market concentration was measured by
applying the HHI to the existing number of Spanish-language broadcasters
yielding extremely high concentration numbers in the small market as
defined.276
In many markets, a small number of broadcasters air Spanishlanguage programming. 277 If the market is defined by the programming
language, the small number of market participants yields high
concentration numbers because the HHI favors markets with larger
numbers of participants.278 Even if a dummy variable were added to the
274. See Univision Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 15, at 4; Bain, Clear
Channel Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 5, Sec. III. A. 2.(The DOJ asserted that
"many local and national advertisers also consider Spanish-language radio to be particularly
effective or necessary to reach their desired customers, especially consumers who listen
predominantly or exclusively to Spanish-language radio. A substantial number of these
advertisers consider Spanish-language radio, either alone or as a complement to other
media, to be the most effective way to reach their target audience, and do not consider other
media, including non-Spanish-language radio, to be a reasonable substitute. These
advertisers would not turn to other media, including radio that is broadcast in a language
other than Spanish, if faced with a small but significant increase in the price of advertising
time on Spanish-language radio.") The DOJ did not identify the source of those conclusions
but as in most merger complaints they are based on interviews with actual or potential
customers and competitors and document reviews.
275. Univision Competitive Impact Statement supra note 15, at 8 (a dearth of
competition for Spanish-language radio advertising dollars would not, as its sole basis, be
enough to entice English-language stations to reformat).
276. See Univision HBC Complaint, supra note 2, at 6-7, 21.
277. See, e.g., Radio & Records, http://www.radioandrecords.com/RRWebsite/ (follow
"ratings" hyperlink; then follow "Austin" hyperlink) (showing that Austin, Texas has five
stations broadcasting in Spanish or bilingual formats including Regional Mexican, Latin
Pop, and Tejano with ratings high enough to be reported by Arbitron, broadcast by two
companies: Univision and Border Media Partners) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008); See also
(follow "ratings"
Radio & Records, http://www.radioandrecords.com/RRWebsite/
hyperlink; then follow "Tucson" hyperlink) (showing that Arizona has four stations
broadcasting in Spanish with ratings high enough to be reported by Arbitron, provided by
three companies: Clear Channel, Lotus and Entravision) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
278. See Univision HBC Complaint, supra note 2, at app. A (definition of HHI). In its
analysis of the Clear Channel buyout by a consortium of private equity firms, the DOJ
concluded that "Clear Channel and Univision's combined Spanish-language listener share
exceeds 75 percent in Houston, 73 percent in Las Vegas, and 70 percent in San Francisco.
Additionally, Clear Channel and Univision's combined Spanish-language advertising
revenue share exceeds 79 percent in Houston, 78 percent in Las Vegas, and 63 percent in
San Francisco." Bain, Clear Channel Complaint, supra note 2, 35. This results in postacquisition HHIs exceeding 6,500 in all three markets where the market is defined as
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HHI analysis to account for the likelihood of Clear Channel, for example,
converting one or two or its English-language radio stations to Spanish, the
small number of market participants would yield HHI levels in many
markets far above levels considered to be competitive. In 2005, "Spanish"
radio formats accounted for approximately two percent of the nation's
commercial radio formats, with English-language formats dominating the
airwaves, topped by American Country programming. 279 This is reflected at
the local level in the small number of broadcasters offering Spanishlanguage and bilingual programming.
The DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that for
telecommunications industry mergers challenged between 1999-2003, most
had HHI levels 2,400 and resulted in post-merger HHI increases above
500.280 These high HHI levels reflect markets with either a small number of
participants or high market shares by the merging parties. The American
Antitrust Institute commented that the Agencies public statements on
mergers "have frequently focused on the number of competitors, rather
than the HHI, as a key part of their analysis. 281 The Merger Guidelines
Commentary concedes that market shares and concentration levels
282
"frequently are used as at least a starting point" in merger reviews.
However, market share and concentration levels depend on an accurate
market definition and should account for marketplace changes including
entry.
Professor Hovenkamp noted that a market definition "captures all the
alternative suppliers that consumers view as producing products that can
substitute for each other and that therefore compete to attract customers. 2 83
For those who wish to advertise in Spanish, the available supply of
advertising sources (broadcasters programming in Spanish or formats
appealing to Spanish-speakers and Latinos) will change with broadcasters'
decisions about program formats.
Spanish-language radio. Id. 36. These high HHI numbers are largely a result of the small
number of broadcasters providing Spanish-language programming in each of these
geographic markets.
279. See Peter DiCola, Future of Music Coalition, False Premises, False Promises, A
Quantitative History of Ownership Consolidation in the Radio Industry 87 (2006), available
at http://www.futureoftnusic.org/images/FMCradiostudy06.pdf.
280. See Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, Merger
6
(2003),
available
at
Challenges
Data,
1999-2003,
Table
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.htm.
281. See AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE WORKING GROUP ON MERGER ENFORCEMENT 4 (2005), available at
(click
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/publicstudiesfr28902/merger-enforcement.htm
on link to American Antitrust Institute Comments).
282. Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 2.
283. Shelanski, supra note 1, at 389-90 (citing Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust
Policy, The Law of Competition and Its Practice 83 (3d ed. 2005)).
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A buyer's view of substitutes may also be influenced by the products
currently available from current suppliers. This narrow outlook does not
capture the potential of entry (or innovation and product cross-selling) to
affect substitution. Where broadcasters have already programmed in
Spanish in other markets and have stations in the geographic market in
question, the possibility of entry, and thus of new substitute suppliers, is
increased. Heyer noted that "[c]ustomers are unlikely . . . to be very
knowledgeable about the profitability to a would-be entrant of coming into
the market in a timely and sufficient fashion following an otherwise
anticompetitive merger. '' 284 In order words, customers may be poor
predictors of market entry.
In the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, "consolidation
of radio outlets by Spanish-language media conglomerates" has paralleled
consolidation in the radio industry as a whole. 285 During that time, the
number of stations offering Spanish-language broadcasts has increased,
mostly from owners changing the station's format from English to
Spanish. 286 Between 1980 and 2002, the number of Spanish-language radio
stations in the United States grew by nearly 1000 percent.287
This cross-format and multistation consolidation is being pursued not
only by "traditional Spanish-language media conglomerates, 2 88 but also by
behemoth media conglomerates such as Clear Channel and NBC who
acquired stations or companies or converted some of their existing media
assets to target the Latino community through Spanish, as well as bilingual
and English-language programming. While the DOJ's goal was to prevent
dominance within an alleged Spanish-language radio market, the market
definition shifted power to large, incumbent English-language broadcasters
who possess the ability to compete in different languages and alleged
markets.
Clear Channel's success in Spanish-language and bilingual
broadcasting demonstrates the fallacy of the DOJ's no-entry assumption. In
2004, shortly after the Univision merger with HBC closed, Clear Channel

284. Heyer, supranote 211, at 108.
285. Castafteda Paredes, supra note 18, at 8.
286. See 18 F.C.C. R. 18834, 18857 (2003) (noting that between the years 2000-2003,
approximately 163 stations switched from an exclusive English-language format to Spanish,
and seventy-seven stations switched from an exclusive Spanish-language format to English).
287. Castafieda Paredes, supra note 18, at 5.
288. See Howard, supra note 17 (noting that several large Spanish-language broadcasters
such as Univision, Entravision and Bustos Media broadcast in English as well as Spanish).
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changed the format of more than twenty of its stations to Spanish.2 89 In
September 2005, Clear Channel declared its "Hispanic Division" a success,
noting increases in the number of listeners ranging from twenty-four
percent in some markets to 312% in others. 290 As of January 2008, Clear
Channel broadcast in Spanish on twenty stations.2 9' It also broadcasts in a
bilingual "Hurban" format, so named for its appeal to "Hispanic Urban"
listeners.292
In November 2006, Clear Channel announced it was putting the
company up for sale and would sell all of its radio stations in markets
ranked below the top 100.293 Only five of its twenty-two Spanish-language
stations are in smaller markets where that station will be sold. 294 However,
in light of Clear Channel's success in Spanish, the station buyer may
continue to broadcast in a Spanish-language format. Clear Channel has
289. See Press Release, supra note 5.
290. See id.
291. See Clear Channel, http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx?
RadioSearch=Spanish (type in Spanish as the search term) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
292. See Press Release, supra note 5; see also Clear Channel, http://www.clearchannel
.com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx?RadioSearch=hurban (type in hurban as the search term)
(list of Clear Channel's current Hurban radio stations) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). It is
noteworthy that Clear Channel's bilingual Hurban format station in Houston, KLOL-FM, is
not listed by Clear Channel in a search for the company's Spanish formats. Though the
Hurban format combines Spanish and English in its music and DJ banter, Clear Channel is
positioning it as distinct from Spanish. Nonetheless, the DOJ required Clear Channel to
divest of KLOL as a condition of approval of its acquisition by several private equity firms
and classified it as a Spanish-language station. Bain, Clear Channel Competitive Impact
Statement, supra note 5, Sec. IV. A. 2. In July 2007, Entravision's KSSE Spanish-hits
format in Los Angeles added three to four English-language hits an hour. Super
Estrella/L.A. in English? KSSE adds English Music, http://www.radioandrecords.com/RR
WebSite/Search.aspx?search=KSSE (follow article title hyperlink) (July 13, 2007) (last
visited Mar. 22, 2008). Though primarily a Spanish format, the mixture of Spanish and
English programming demonstrates the difficulty in classifying stations by language. This
highlights the potential constitutional vagueness of defining a market by the program's
language. How much English within a Spanish mix gets a broadcaster out of the "Spanish"
market and into the "English" market? Though an exploration of the vagueness issue is
beyond of the scope of this paper, the lack of a clear standard raises the potential that the
market definition is constitutionally vague, leading broadcasters to steer clear of
programming decisions to avoid the ramifications of the smaller "Spanish" antitrust market.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) ("[W]here a vague statute 'abuts
upon sensitive areas of First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of
those freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the
unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."')
(internal quotations omitted).
293. See Press Release, Clear Channel, Clear Channel Announces Plan to Sell Radio
Stations Outside the Top 100 Markets and Entire Television Group, (November 16, 2006)
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1825.
294. For a list of the top fifty radio markets, see ARBITRON RADIO MARKET RANKINGS:
SPRING 2007, availableat http://www.arbitron.com/radiostations/mmOO105O.asp; see also
Clear Channel Spanish stations list, http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx
?RadioSearch=Spanish (type in search term Spanish) (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
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announced no plans to discontinue Spanish-language and bilingual
broadcasting in its remaining markets.
Clear Channel received FCC approval to transfer its thirty-five full
and low-power television stations to Newport Television LLC
("Newport").295 Newport is wholly owned by investment funds that are
controlled by affiliates of Providence Equity Partners, Inc. ("PEP").296 As a
result of the March 2007 sale of Univision to a consortium of private equity
investors including PEP, PEP holds an attributable, nineteen percent
interest in Univision. 297 PEP holds an attributable, sixteen percent interest
in Freedom Communications Holdings, Inc. ("Freedom") which runs
several newspapers. 298 "PEP's interests in Univision and Freedom resulted
in violation of Section 73.3555(d) of the Commission's Rules (the
'newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule') in five markets." 299
In its 2007 approval of the Univision sale to several equity investors,
including PEP, the FCC required PEP to comply with the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule within six months of
consummation of the Univision sale transaction. It was given the choice of
divesting "either the necessary broadcast stations in those markets where
PEP's interest in Freedom resulted in violation of the broadcast/newspaper
300
cross-ownership rule, or divesting PEP's minority interest in Freedom.,
In approving the sale of Clear Channel's television stations to PEP, the
FCC decided that it would not grant an additional six-month waiver that
PEP requested to comply with the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership
rules and required PEP to comply with the rules prior to consummation of
its purchase of the Clear Channel television stations.30 '
One noteworthy aspect of the FCC's decision not to give PEP more
time to comply with the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rules is that
the FCC did not extend the waiver to come into compliance with the rules
based on the fact that the Univision and Entravision television stations in
which PEP has an attributable interest primarily broadcast in Spanish. In
contrast, in 2002:
295. See Clear Channel Broadcasting Licenses, Inc., For Assignment of License of
Station WPMI-TV, Mobile, Alabama, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.R.
21196, para. 1, (2007) [hereinafter Clear Channel TVsale].
296. Id. at para. 2.
297. Id. at para. 3.
298. Id.
299. Id. at para. 4; see also 47 C.F.R. §73.3555(d) (2006).
300. See Clear Channel TV Sale, supra note 302, at para. 4.
301. Id. atpara. 13.
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[T]he FCC granted NBC a waiver allowing it to keep three television
stations in the Los Angeles market for twelve months (the rules
allowed common ownership of no more than two television stations in
that market), when30 2NBC acquired Telemundo, a Spanish-language
television network.

"The [NBC] waiver was based on the Commission's finding that
Telemundo's Spanish-language television station did not compete directly
with NBC's television broadcasts in English to a wider audience. 3 °3 In
light of the FCC's 2003 approval of Univision's merger with HBC based
on the Commission's conclusion that Spanish- and English-language radio
do not compete in separate markets,3 °4 it is noteworthy that that the
Commission did not even discuss language differences as relevant to the
request to extend the time for PEP to comply with the newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership rules.
PEP's purchase of Clear Channel's television stations would also
violate the FCC's rules limiting common ownership of television stations
in nine markets. 30 5 The FCC concluded that because the television sale is
"occurring within the context of the larger sale of Clear Channel to BT
Triple Crown, which will also entail the potential spin-off of a number of
radio stations" it is "reasonable to grant a short period of time to permit the
restructuring of PEP's investments and/or sale of television stations. 30 6
Accordingly, the FCC determined that "with the exception of the
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY, market, it would be in the public interest to
grant Newport a temporary, six-month waiver of the local television
' 30 7
ownership rule in the eight markets subject to [certain] conditions."
Again, it is noteworthy that the language of the broadcasts was not a factor
in the FCC's decisions. Rather, the Commission expressed concerns that its
rules concerning multiple ownership be respected, approving the extension
in light of the fact that the overall transactions might increase ownership
diversity.
For the Clear Channel sale of the remainder of the company including
its radio assets, Thomas H. Lee Partners ("TLP") will control fifty percent
of the equity in the holding company that will control Clear Channel once

302. Sandoval, supranote 9, at n. 203.
303. Id.
304. See FCC HBC UVN Order, supra note 8, at 18869-70.
305. See Clear Channel TV Sale, supra note 302 at para. 7.
306. Id.at para. 20.
307. Id.at para. 21; see also Telemundo Commc'ns, Inc. & TN Acquisition Corp.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 6958 (2002).
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the deal is closed. 30 8 TLP also controls 23.314% of Univision's equity and
30 9
voting shares, as does PEP and Madison Dearborn Partners.
In its 2008 review and approval of the sale of Clear Channel to a
consortium of private equity firms, the DOJ once again defined the relevant
market for analysis of TLP's interests in the Clear Channel deal as "the
provision of advertising time on Spanish-language radio stations" and
expressed concern that the merger would decrease competition because of
TLP's interests in Univision which also broadcasts Spanish-language radio
programming in three markets where it competes with Clear Channel's
Spanish-language radio stations."'
Bain Capital LLC (Bain), another member of the equity consortium
trying to acquire Clear Channel, controls together with TLP 50 percent of
the voting interests of Cumulus Media Partners (Cumulus), a major radio
3
company that competes against Clear Channel in two markets. "' The DOJ
noted that companies that operate radio stations like Clear Channel,
Cumulus and Univision "sell advertising time to local and national
advertisers in each geographic market where they operate," and defined the
relevant product market as "the provision of advertising time on radio
stations."3 ' The DOJ analyzed the potential buyers' interests in Cumulus
according to the "advertising time on radio stations market definition," and
TLP's interests in Univision according to the "Spanish-language radio
station definition."3"3 The DOJ noted that Cumulus and Clear Channel's

308. Press Release, Clear Channel, Clear Channel Announces Second Amendment to
Merger Agreement with Private Equity Group co-led by Bain Capital Partners, LLC and
Thomas H. Lee Partners, L.P.. (May 18, 2007), http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/
PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD=1965. Bain and TLP will each control fifty percent of
the entity that will acquire voting and equity control of Clear Channel. See Form S-4
Registration Statement, BT Triple Crown Capital Holdings III, Inc., (July 9, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1400891/000095013407014815/d47142a1 sv4za.htm#25
1.
309. Broadcast Media Partners, Inc. (BMPI), a private equity consortium of Thomas H.
Lee Partners; Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC; Providence Equity Partners, Inc.; Saban
Capital Group ("Saban"); Texas Pacific Group paid $13.7 billion in 2007 for Univision's
radio, television and other assets. Each entity except Saban holds 23.314% of the votes and
equity stock of BMPI and names two members of the BMPI Board of Directors. Saban
holds a 6.744 percent voting and equity interest and can designate one director. Univision
BMP MO&O, supra note 4, at 5844-5845").
310. Bain, Clear Channel Complaint,supra note 2.
311. Id. at 3.
312. Id. at 17, 21.
313. Id.at 28-36.
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stations were similarly formatted and competed to attract listeners from
each other, as were Clear Channel's Spanish-language stations and
Univision's stations in overlapping geographic markets.3t 4 The DOJ
required divestiture of Clear Channel's stations in the three markets in
which it competes with Univision and in the two markets in which it
competes with Cumulus as a condition of approval of the acquisition of
Clear Channel by the equity investors.3" 5 The DOJ's continued use of a
Spanish-language radio station product market definition in the 2008 Clear
Channel case highlights the need to analyze the antitrust and constitutional
issues, and potential impact on broadcaster and audience speech, raised by
this market definition.
The FCC's approval of the Clear Channel private equity buyout
transaction did not include any explicit analysis of competition within
languages or formats but focused on compliance with the multiple
ownership rules." 6 The FCC noted the potential for the deal to increase
competition because of the sale of stations in forty-two markets where
Clear Channel was not in compliance with the multiple ownership rules
because of changes in the ways the markets were measured. It required as a
condition of the merger that TLP comply with the FCC's previous order
that TLP divest its interest in Cumulus if Univision retained its broadcast
stations in markets where both Cumulus and Univision operate." 7
These transactions also demonstrate that broadcast owners (and
investors who control them) frequently cross the perceived language divide
in their corporate acquisition and programming choices. Professor Castefla
Paredes observed that "interlocking interests" between Spanish-language
and English-language media are changing the media landscape.3 18 TLP's
interests in both Univision and Clear Channel (once the deal is closed), and
PEP's interests in Univision, Entravision and Clear Channel, exemplify the
interlocking equity and directorate interests that shape media strategies
across languages, companies, and alleged markets.
Similarly, NBC leverages its programs and resources across
languages through its control of the television network Telemundo, which
it acquired in 2002. 3 19 NBC's control of Telemundo creates advertising
synergies between NBC's English, Spanish, and bilingual programming.

314. Id. at 29, 33.
315. Bain, ClearChannel CompetitiveImpact Statement, supra note 5, Sec. IV A.
316. FCC ClearChannelMO&O, supra, note 5.
317. Id., 2, 10; Univision BMP MO&O, supranote 5.
318. Castafieda Paredes, supra note 18, at 14.
319. See NBC and Telemundo Comnmc'n Group, Inc., Transaction Records (April 10,
2002), availableat http://www.fcc.gov/transaction/nbc-telemundo.html.
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Steve Mandala, executive vice president for sales at Telemundo, stated:
"Our sales organization is quite literally a part of NBC's overall sales
organization., 320 Luis Nufiez commented, "[p]art of the explanation for
Telemundo's higher ratio of advertising revenues to audience share [as
benefit of being part of a large English
compared to Univision] is32the
1
company.,
media
language
Language-switching is also common among broadcasters with roots
in Spanish-language broadcasting. Traditionally, Spanish-language
broadcasters such as Univision, Entravision, Border Media Partners, and
Bustos Media also air English-language broadcasts. 322 Those companies air
English-language programming to reach either a target audience within a
market or a wider audience including Latinos. Since English-language
programming generally pays more than Spanish-language programming, it
also makes economic sense to diversify broadcast language formats.
Broadcasting in different languages is a strategic choice of companies with
roots in both English and Spanish, demonstrating the unity rather than the
separation of the market.
The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. GeneralDynamics
Corp.323 that "[e]vidence of past production does not, as a matter of logic,
necessarily give a proper picture of a company's future ability to
compete. 324 In its monopoly case against Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that "because of the possibility of competition from new
325
entrants, looking to current market share alone can be 'misleading.'
"Market share reflects current sales, but today's sales do not always
indicate power over sales and price tomorrow. 32 6 Furthermore, "[e]ven if
one could define markets and assign market shares in the marketplace of
320. Kevin Downey, Telemundo Gets Its Share, BROAD. & CABLE, Sept. 8, 2003, at 30,
available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA321261.html.
321. SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA, supra note 262, at 36.
322. See Howard, supra note 17 (noting that Bustos Media broadcasts two stations in
Eastern Washington in English). At least five of Entravision's forty-seven radio stations
broadcast in English. See Entravision Communications Corp., Radio Station Listings,
http://www.entravision.com/template.cfin?page=media&subpage=radioAll (last visited Mar.
22, 2008). At least four of Univision's seventy radio stations broadcast in English formats.
See Univision Radio, Station List, http://www.univision.net/corp/en/urg_list.jsp (last visited
Mar. 22, 2008).
323. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
324. Id. at 501.
325. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
326. Id. (citing Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th
Cir. 1986)).
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ideas, just how reliable would these historic market shares be under
dynamic market conditions?" 327 To judge the "probable anticompetitive
effect" of the merger "its structure, history and probable future" must be
considered.32 8 This should include consideration of the likelihood of format
changes and new entrants into programming as part of market analysis.
The lack of structural barriers to entry for English-language
broadcasters planning to broadcast in Spanish indicates that current market
share may not be a good predictor of market power. While a large market
share might indicate some current influence over price and competition,
new entrants may take some of that market share through program
innovation or price competition. "Market share is just one pathway to
329
estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration.
If market shares are "in flux or if new firms are regularly entering the
market, a firm's momentarily large (or small) share of the market may say
little about that firm's market power (or lack thereof). 33 ° Professor
Shelanski observed that in broadcasting, "[c]urrent market shares may only
reflect transient popularity of programming.' 331 Professor Shelanski also
observed that:
First Amendment values may be at stake if antitrust authorities base
merger enforcement decisions on the popularity of a particular media
provider's content. If merger clearance hinges on how much market
share a particular media outlet has at a given moment, then the antitrust
process might appear to be a form of handicapping where the
government allows less popular speakers to merge and gain any
attendant benefits of consolidation, but denies the same benefits 332to
other speakers based solely on the fact that they are already popular.
Market share also reflects current market participants. Broadcasters
frequently change formats and can quickly contest not only market share
but conceptions about the market.
In the Microsoft case, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that in determining
market share, we must also consider whether structural barriers protect the
company's future position.3 33 The DOJ and FTC state in the Commentary

327. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 249, 277 (2001).
328. Brown Shoe, 379 U.S., at 322 n.38.
329. Stucke & Grunes, supranote 335, at 300.
330. Shelanski, supra note 1, at 410.
331. Id. Market share in radio may also be affected by programming content, as well as a
station's signal strength and its ability to use its economies of scale to attract talent and
advertisers to develop programming and gain audience share.
332. Shelanski, supranote 1, at 411.
333. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54-5 ("Considering the possibility of new rivals, the
court focused not only on Microsoft's present market share, but also on the structural barrier
that protects the company's future position.").

Number 3]

ANTITRUST LANGUAGE BARRIERS

on the Merger Guidelines that they take into account the obstacles to entry
3 34
including regulation, intellectual property, and economies of scale.
Unlike cable operators, even the largest Spanish-language
broadcasters do not possess a bottleneck monopoly over a physical
335
pathway that would allow them to control competitors' access. In passing
the Cable Act, Congress was concerned that cable operators could use their
control over which stations to carry to shut out over-the-air broadcasters,
reducing the viability of the broadcast medium and the public's access to
their content and viewpoint.336 This "bottleneck" control meant that cable
operators could "silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick
of the switch. 337 Some broadcast signals are more powerful and can be
heard over a wider area, yet broadcasters are prohibited from interfering
with their rivals' signals, and do not have the bottleneck power over
competitors' programming that concerned the Supreme Court in Turner I
and Turner II.
Additionally, broadcasters lack the intellectual property protections
for their radio formats that deter others from competing for their audience.
While the broadcast itself may be protected by copyright, the format is not,
whether it be Spanish, bilingual, or country music. Broadcasters can and
often do imitate "hot" formats and change their formats to suit audience
tastes and demographics. A broadcaster may distinguish itself through
radio personalities or the mix of music it chooses or news it airs. However,
unlike pharmaceutical markets, which require extensive investment,
testing, and government approval for the introduction of a new drug, once a
broadcaster is licensed by the FCC, it is free to determine what formats to
offer and may change formats at will. 338 For those with FCC licenses, no
intellectual property or regulatory requirements stand in the way of
changing formats or languages.
In the computer sphere, network effects raise entry barriers as a
standard becomes imbedded, attracting not only more users, but more
339
To a certain
programs, such as software applications, for those users.
extent, audience size and common interests may create the equivalent of
334. Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199.

335. Cf TurnerI,512 U.S.at 662.
336. Id. at 623-24.
337. Id.at 656.
338. See FCC v. WNCN Listener's Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 600 (1981) (relying on the
market to determine program diversity in entertainment formats); Deregulation of Radio, 84
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981) (eliminating FCC programming guidelines).
339. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 55.
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network effects in radio or television. The larger an identifiable audience,
the more likely it is to attract programming targeted to its interest. 340 This
results in an abundance of English-language programming, geared at what
advertisers and producers view as the "mainstream," predominantly white
audience, whether or not that audience still predominates.341 Professor
Philip Napoli commented "[m]inority-targeted media content suffers not
only from the potentially lower valuations of minority audiences, but also
the fact that, by definition, it appeals to a small audience., 342 However, the
U.S. Latino population is large and growing.343 Its buying power is also
increasing. 344 Its growth is attracting more programming, both in English
and in Spanish. However, "Spanish" formats still constitute only two
345
percent of radio formats nationally.
While cohesive groups may arguably produce the equivalent of
network effects, the question is whether they also erect the kind of entry
barriers characteristic of the software market. Broadcasters lack proprietary
control over the factor driving the network effects-population growth.
Unlike a computer operating system whose code is controlled by one
company and whose popularity attracts users and software developers,
population growth attracts programmers but does not give them any control
over the market. While one broadcaster may initially attract a large portion
of that population, the very growth of the population will likely attract
more broadcasters and programmers to compete for a share of that market.
In the absence of structural barriers to entry, the loyalty of that audience is
subject to competition.
In analyzing entry, the DOJ and FTC state in the Commentary on the
Merger Guidelines that they take into account the "likelihood, timeliness,
and sufficiency of the supply response.", 346 The Agencies examine sunk
340. See Steven S. Wildman & Theomary Karamanis, The Economics of Minority
Programming,ASPEN INSTITUTE COMMUNICATIONS & SOCIETY ROUNDTABLE ON DIVERSITY
INTHE MEDIA 2-3 (1997), availableat http://www.aspeninstitute.org/site/c.huLWJeMRKpH
/b.785521/k.7429/TheEconomics of MinorityProgramming.htm (positing that until the
number of broadcast stations or the size of the minority audience grows, it will be more
profitable to serve the majority).
341. See id. at 2-4.
342. Napoli, supra note 169, at 181.
343. See Mark Mather & Kelvin Pollard, Hispanic Gains Minimize Population Losses in
Rural and Small-Town America, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (2007) ("Between 2000
and 2006, the Hispanic population grew from 35.3 million to 44.3 million, a 26 percent
increase."), availableat http://www.prb.org/Articles/2007/HispanicGains.aspx.
344. Latinos in the U.S. controlled $798.3 billion in buying power in 2006, 8.4 percent
of U.S. consumer purchasing power. Jeffrey M. Humphreys, The Multicultural Economy
2006, 66 Ga. Bus. & Econ. Conditions (Third Quarter) 1, 10 (2006), availableat http://w
ww.selig.uga.edu/forecast/GBEC/GBEC063Q.pdf.
345. DiCola, supranote 286, at 87.
346. Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 37.
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cannot be recovered after entry, and likely returns associated with
costs that
34 7
entry.

For incumbent broadcasters who already have FCC licenses and
broadcasting facilities, the sunk costs to change formats would be
associated with hiring new talent as needed to air the programming or in
purchasing programming from other syndicated sellers such as ABC radio
which produces and sells Spanish-language programming. 348 If a
broadcaster already programs in Spanish in one market, the sunk costs to
change formats in another market are substantially lowered. They can
transfer that programming using the Internet or satellites, while
broadcasting local "inserts" about weather and news. No regulatory
approvals are needed to change formats.
The right to play music in Spanish or English is already afforded to
broadcasters through the licenses that they purchase from Broadcast Music,
Inc. ("BMI") or the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers ("ASCAP"). 349 The music licenses are "blanket" licenses that
permit a radio or television broadcaster to play any of the music within the
BMI or ASCAP catalogue. 350 Under these agreements, English-language
broadcasters are already paying for the rights to play Spanish-language
music and Spanish-language broadcasters are paying for the rights to play
bilingual and English, as well as Spanish-language music. Thus music
licensing costs are not an additional entry barrier to changing a broadcast's
language.
A shortage of personnel with the skills to change formats might lead
agencies to conclude entrants would be unable to secure
antitrust
the
essential "human resources., 351 However, consolidation in the radio
industry has led many companies to fire personnel, making people
available for new formats.352 Broadcasters can also train their staff to sell
additional formats, using their skills and resources gained in other markets.
347. See id. at 37-38.
348. Katy Bachman, ABC Radio, Spanish BroadcastingStrike Deal, ADWEEK, Nov. =10,

2004, availableat http://www.adweek.com/aw/search/article-display.jsp?vnucontentid
1000717039.

349.
350.
351.
352.

See generally Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
Id.
See Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 44.
See Peter DiCola, Employment and Wage Effects of Radio Consolidation,in MEDIA

DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM, MEANING AND METRICS 65, 72 (Philip Napoli ed., 2007) (noting
that following the 1996 Telecomm. Act through 2002, employment per station dropped from
9.54 to 8.70. "Greater consolidation, as measured by stations per owned, has a negative and
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The DOJ has justified its assumption that broadcasters will not change
their formats by questioning whether broadcasters would be willing to
forgo the revenue associated with a format change.353 The number of
switches between language formats suggests that many broadcasters are not
only willing to make such a short-term sacrifice, but that it often leads to
long-term profits. For example, Clear Channel stated that its Hispanic
division was a "hit," citing its leading ratings in most markets in which it
354
had changed format.
The DOJ and FTC also examine "whether firms would have an
3 55
adequate profit incentive to enter at prices prevailing before the merger.
They note that in a market with "well-established brands, successful entry
usually requires a substantial investment in advertising and promotional
activity over a long period of time to build share and achieve widespread
distribution through retail channels. 3 56
Incumbent broadcasters already possess the equivalent of a retail
channel, a mechanism through which to distribute their product:
programming which attracts audiences. Many Spanish-language
broadcasters face the opposite situation of Staples and Office Depot in their
proposed merger, which was abandoned after FTC objection. In FTC v.
Staples,357 the government persuaded the court that a new office superstore
entrant would have "difficulty in achieving economies of scale in, among
3 58
other things, advertising and distribution.
Even the largest Spanish-language radio broadcaster, such as
Univision, which controlled seventy radio stations after its merger with
statistically significant association with employment of both news reporters and broadcast
technicians.").
353. See Joel Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers, Address at the ANA Hotel 8-9 (Feb. 19, 1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1055.htm. See also, Bain, Clear
Channel Complaint, supra note 2, at
45 (the DOJ concluded entry would not deter
anticompetitive effects of the Clear Channel private equity buyout because "(f)or those
stations in these markets that have large shares in other coveted demographics, a format
shift solely in response to small but significant increases in price by Clear Channel,
[Cumulus], or Univision is not likely because it would not be profitable. For those radio
stations that may have incentives to change formats in response to small but significant
increases in price by Clear Channel, CMP, and Univision, their shift would not be sufficient
to mitigate the anticompetitive effects resulting from this acquisition.")
354. See Press Release, supra note 5.
355. See Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 38.
356. Id. at 38-39.
357. Staples, 970 F. Supp 991.
358. Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 38-39 (citing the proposed
merger of Staples and Office Depot as an example of risks associated with entry caused by
the merger parties' market share and economies of scale); see also Hovenkamp, supra note
290, at 40 (noting that "scale economies can permit incumbent firms to earn monopoly
returns up to a certain point without encouraging new entry.").
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HBC, had few stations in 2005 compared to broadcasters such as Clear
Channel, which controlled 1,184 radio stations, Cumulus, which controlled
295 radio stations, Citadel, which controlled 223 radio stations, or CBSowned Infinity, which controlled 178 radio stations. 359 Even after Clear
Channel sells all 448 of its stations in markets ranked below 100, the
3 60
company will still control 766 radio stations, all in top-100 markets.
Thus, the economies of scale weigh in favor of large, predominantly
English-language broadcasters, indicating this is not a high barrier to entry
from which to defend market share in the allegedly separate "Spanishlanguage" radio market.
Some broadcasters claimed that Univision did not allow them to
advertise their rival programs on Univision's television stations or on
Entravision's radio stations before Univison's merger with HBC.3 6 , The
FCC declined to find that was a basis for prohibiting or imposing
conditions upon Univision's merger with HBC, particularly in light of the

359. See Univision Radio: Our Story, http://www.univision.net/corp/en/urg.jsp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2008); DiCola,, supra note 284, at 36.
360. DiCola, supra note 284, at n. 13.
361. See e.g., Telemundo Commc'n Group, Ex ParteLetter, FCC MB Docket No. 02235, 5-6 (August 21, 2003), availableat http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativ
eorjpdf=pdf&iddocument=-6514683779 (complaining that Univision and related entities
refused to accept ads for Telemundo's rival Spanish and bilingual television programs. As
such, Telemundo suggests that the FCC establish a rule that "no radio station in which
[Univision] has any ownership interest will discriminate on prices, terms or conditions ...
against the purchase of radio advertising time by any other Spanish-language television
entity, including Telemundo."); compare SPANISH LANGUAGE MEDIA, supra note 260, at 46
(calling for rules to prohibit dominant companies from using their existing market power in
an anticompetitive fashion, by "prohibiting companies that exceed threshold levels of
audience share for unique populations from refusing to accept competitors" advertising),
with CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973) (recognizing a broadcaster's
prerogative to reject ads as an essential component of its right to exercise editorial
judgment). To impose a different rule on broadcasters who serve Spanish-speakers,
Chinese-speakers or other discrete populations while allowing English-language
broadcasters the liberty to choose whether or not to accept advertisements would create
disincentives to air programming serving minority-language communities because they
would face more restrictions than their English-language counterparts, raising First
Amendment concerns. Additionally, where a company has refused to open up its facilities to
its rivals, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize a duty to cooperate with rivals
in all but the most limited circumstances. See Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004). While an analysis of this proposal is
beyond the scope of this paper, it highlights the constitutional and antitrust law issues at
stake in determining whether Spanish-language media compete in a market different from
English-language media and should bear additional burdens.
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resources and alternatives available to competitors such as Telemundo, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of NBC.362
The ability of Clear Channel and others to use their capital from
English- and Spanish-language programming across markets and languages
emphasizes the transient nature of market share and the lack of barriers
between the alleged "markets." Changing formats, whether within or
between languages, requires advertising and promotion, but many
broadcasters have found it worthwhile to do so. The more stations a
company controls, the greater its ability to use those economies of scale in
advertising, promotion, and selling across formats to make its programming
even more attractive to audiences and advertisers. While Univision may
have developed a loyal following of audiences and advertisers, Clear
Channel's economies of scale make it an instant formidable competitor if it
chooses to use those resources for Spanish-language programming.
Goliaths may enter and quickly take a dominant position in Spanishlanguage formats, demonstrating the fallacy in assuming they will not
enter.
From the advertiser's perspective, once the English-language
broadcaster has entered the alleged "Spanish-language radio market," the
advertiser will have more firms from which to purchase ads during
Spanish-language broadcasts. The former English-language broadcaster
would be defined as participating in the alleged "Spanish-language" radio
market according to the market definition used in the DOJ's analysis of the
Univision merger with HBC. However, if that broadcaster still has other
English-language stations in the same geographic market, it may offer
discounted multiformat, multilingual packages, selling the Spanishlanguage station at a cheaper price than its competitor if an ad is also
bought on the English-language station.363 The advertiser's ability to buy
packages across languages challenges the concept that the markets are
rigidly separated by language.
This also raises the issue of whether English-language broadcasters
who air Spanish-language programming only in certain geographic markets
should be classified as participants in the alleged Spanish-language radio

362. FCC HBC UVN Order, supra note 8, at n.107 (emphasizing that Telemundo is a
subsidiary of NBC and has many resources and alternatives with which to compete).
363. See Comments of Catherine J.K. Sandoval, et. al. re: 2006 Quadrennial Review of
the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, MB Dockets No. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244 at
5-6 (October 23, 2006), availableat http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_
orpdf-=pdf&iddocument--6518535748 (noting that some broadcasters package minorityoriented programming with "general market programming," offering to sell advertisements
on minority-oriented stations for highly discounted prices, a practice known as a "Dollar a
Holler").
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market in other geographic markets where they only air English-language
programming. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines indicate that such a firm
should be viewed as a market participant if, in response to a "small but
significant and nontransitory" price increase, it likely would enter rapidly
into production or sale of a market product in the market's area, without
incurring significant sunk costs of entry and exit.364 The assessment of
whether the firm will likely incur significant sunk costs of entry and exit is
critical in this analysis. 365 The DOJ simply dismissed any likelihood that
English-language firms would change the language of their programming
in response to such price increases rather than calculating the costs and
likelihood of entry. More is required in the analysis of future mergers. The
DOJ must consider the possibility that stations not currently airing Spanishlanguage programming in any geographic market (such as Clear Channel
before Univision's merger with HBC) will begin to do so. Although sunk
costs of entry and exit must be examined, at the extreme, all incumbent
broadcasters may be potential Spanish-language broadcasters, a conclusion
that challenges the market definition itself.
Professor Shelanski argues that "[t]he problem with narrowly defined
markets, however, is that they may obscure the dangers of consolidation
,,366 He observes:
among firms from different but overlapping markets ....
a
few
firms own
in
which
structure
The result could well be a market
and exercise editorial control over a broad portfolio of different kinds
of media outlets. While narrow market definition would prevent
concentration within categories of media outlets, it would not prevent
367
and indeed might facilitate concentration across all types of media.
Although Professor Shelanski's analysis is directed at consolidation across
categories of media such as cable and over-the-air broadcast, his insights
are applicable to the problem with defining a broadcast market by the
program's language.

364. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, at 5.
365. The Guidelines also note that:
Probable supply responses that require the entrant to incur significant sunk costs
of entry and exit are not part of market measurement, but are included in the
analysis of the significance of entry. See Section 3. Entrants that must commit
substantial sunk costs are regarded as 'committed' entrants because those sunk
costs make entry irreversible in the short term without foregoing that investment;
thus the likelihood of their entry must be evaluated with regard to their long-term
profitability.
Id. at n.7.
366. Shelanski, supranote 1, at 406.
367. Id.at 406-07.
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The narrow market definition obscures the ability of companies to
broadcast in various languages, resulting in the option to draw upon market
power in one language, especially the dominant language (English), and
use it to successfully gain audience and advertiser share in another
language. Professor Grimes commented, "[l]arge, oligopolistic firms can
wield power strategically, targeting less powerful rivals, customers, or
suppliers., 368 When markets are artificially separated, firms who would
have been small players in the large market become large players in the
small market. Yet, the big players in the large market can use their
"relational power 369 to enter and gain market share in what has been
defined as the "small market." This ability to cross-over should raise
questions about whether the markets are separate.
One of Congress's goals in enacting must-carry rules was to ensure
that there were "multiple speakers" in the video marketplace. 370 The ability
of English-language broadcasters to enter into Spanish-language
programming illustrates that characterizing the radio marketplace by the
Spanish language is not necessary to ensure competition or diversity-nor
does it recognize the reality of a broadcast marketplace that transcends
language.
If the HBC/Univision case had proceeded to litigation, the DOJ would
have been required to support its no-entry assumption. Similarly in the
Clear Channel private equity buyout, the parties settled and did not
challenge the Spanish-language radio market definition or entry
assumptions because they valued the overall deal more. Agreement to settle
meant those assumptions went largely unchallenged. Such assumptions are
damaging even at the complaint and settlement stages since they encourage
parties to take actions they might not take if the assumptions were
subjected to rigorous analysis. Furthermore, they set a precedent for future
merger analysis, which is especially harmful if the analysis does not meet
antitrust or constitutional standards.
Douglas Melamed observed that parties to a consent decree are likely
to only consider the effects of negotiation on their own transaction. 71
Parties often value their deal more than the remedies the DOJ or FTC may
require and agree to settle, enabling the Agencies to obtain relief through
settlements that they would not obtain in litigation.372 This process gives
368. Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act's UnintendedBias Against Lilliputians: Small
Players' Collective Actions Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTiTRUST L.J. 195,
195 (2001).
369. Id.
370. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 333, at 285.
371. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 14
(1995).
372. Id.
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the Agencies tremendous power to encourage parties to accept their
suggested remedies. However, it should not detract from the "factintensive" nature of the merger review the DOJ and FTC emphasized in
their Commentary on the Merger Guidelines. 373 Nor should it set a
precedent for reviews of future transactions, particularly when the First
Amendment constraints on the market definition were not articulated or
analyzed.
V. CONCLUSION
The merger review process has yet to identify or publicly analyze
whether defining a radio market by the program's language is subject to
constitutional scrutiny as a content-based or content-neutral distinction.
Yet, merger analysis must respect the constitutional rights of broadcasters
and listeners. Additionally, assumptions cannot substitute for analysis,
particularly where the DOJ's assumption that no broadcaster would change
formats to compete in other languages is contrary to the evidence and thus
challenges the DOJ's market conception.
The speech rights at stake for audiences are demonstrated in the
reasons for using Spanish-language media. Audiences listen to and watch
Spanish-language radio and television not simply because of their language
preference or ability. Nor do they tune-in merely for the cultural,
entertainment and sports programming. Rather, they are also attracted to
such media for news and public affairs programming tailored to the
interests of Latinos in the United States, including news about Latin
America. English-language programming also attracts many Latinos, while
pushing away others by its stereotyping or relative lack of inclusion of
Latino characters and stories. The net result is that audiences choose
Spanish-language or English-language media for its content. This tight
nexus between content and language indicates that defining a radio market
by language is a content-based regulation, mandating strict scrutiny to
ensure that the means are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
The vital role of Spanish-language media in providing targeted and distinct
news and public affairs information underscores the need to balance the
government's purported interest in defining the radio market by language
with its burdens on speech.
For broadcasters, language is a competitive tool within the arsenal of
consolidated media companies. The ability of Clear Channel and others to

373. See Merger Guidelines Commentary, supra note 199, at 3.
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use their capital from English- and Spanish-language programming across
markets and languages emphasizes the lack of structural barriers between
the alleged "markets." English-language broadcasting Goliaths can enter
and quickly take a dominant position in Spanish-language formats. The
market entry data challenges the DOJ's underlying assumption that no
competitor would change its programming to compete in the Spanishlanguage (and bilingual) market. This dynamic entry by large, incumbent,
traditionally English-language competitors should also challenge the
concept of separate Spanish- and English-language markets. It suggests that
the market structures are not separated, but dynamic and integrated.
The DOJ's faulty language-based market definition has shifted power
to large, incumbent English-language broadcasters who can bring their
economies of scale from the larger English-language station clusters to
compete in Spanish. If the transaction falls within the thresholds requiring
antitrust approval, those specializing in Spanish may be limited in their
options to expand. Under that narrow market definition, Spanish-language
broadcasters subject to antitrust approval with more than nominal share in a
geographic market may be limited in their ability to expand by being
allowed to acquire only stations which currently broadcast in English or
languages other than Spanish. However, English-formatted stations will
likely be more expensive than stations broadcasting in Spanish because the
advertising industry pays more for English-speaking than Spanish-speaking
audiences.374 This process creates a competitive advantage for Englishlanguage broadcasters. It also discourages specialization in Spanishlanguage programming within a local market, depriving the population of
distinctive programming it may wish to hear.
While designed to prevent undue concentration "within" the alleged
"Spanish-language" broadcast market as defined by the DOJ, the First
Amendment rights at stake require a reexamination of the concept that
media markets are rigidly separated by language. The publicly available
evidence of advertiser and audience substitution between Spanish and
English-language media, coupled with broadcasters airing programming
and selling advertising packages that cross languages, call into question
whether the government can meet its burden of proving that the markets are
separated by language. Such proof is a predicate to demonstrating that the
government has a compelling or substantial state interest in that distinction.
The disincentives the market definition creates to broadcast in Spanish or
other minority languages raise concerns about the burdens of this
distinction on the speech rights of audiences and broadcasters. Our
collective interests in democratic debate and access to information through
the media, as well as in the promotion of fair competition, compel
374. See Napoli, supra note 167, at 171-72.
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examination of the threats to First Amendment freedoms created by an
antitrust market definition based on language that erects false language and
market barriers.

480

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60

